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The dark web is the hidden part of the internet that is not indexed by search engines and 
is only accessible with a specific browser like The Onion Router (Tor).  Tor was originally 
developed as a means of secure communications and is still used worldwide for individuals 
seeking privacy or those wanting to circumvent restrictive regimes.  The dark web has become 
synonymous with nefarious and illicit content which manifests itself in underground 
marketplaces containing illegal goods such as drugs, stolen credit cards, stolen user credentials, 
child pornography, and more (Kohen, 2017).  Dark web marketplaces  contribute both to illegal 
drug usage and child pornography.  Given the fundamental goal of privacy and anonymity, 
there are limited techniques for finding forensic artifacts and evidence files when investigating 
misuse and criminal activity in the dark web.  
Previous studies of digital forensics frameworks reveal a common theme of collection, 
examination, analysis, and reporting.  The existence and frequency of proposed frameworks 
demonstrate the acceptance and utility of these frameworks in the field of digital forensics.  
Previous studies of dark web forensics have focused on network forensics rather than host-
based forensics.  macOS is the second most popular operating system after Windows (Net 
Marketshare, n.d.); however, previous research has focused on the Windows operating system 
with little attention given to macOS forensics.   
This research uses design science methodology to develop a framework for identifying 
host-based artifacts during a digital forensic investigation involving suspected dark web use.  
Both the Windows operating system and macOS are included with the expected result being a 
reusable, comprehensive framework that is easy to follow and assists investigators in finding 
artifacts that are designed to be hidden or otherwise hard to find.  The contribution of this 
framework will assist investigators in identifying evidence in cases where the user is suspected 
of accessing the dark web for criminal intent when little or no other evidence of a crime is 
present. 
The artifact produced for this research, The Dark Web Artifact Framework, was 
evaluated using three different methods to ensure that it met the stated goals of being easy to 
follow, considering both Windows and macOS operating systems, considering multiple ways 
of accessing the dark web, and being adaptable to future platforms.  The methods of evaluation 
v 
included experimental evaluation conducted using a simulation of the framework, comparison 
of a previously worked dark web case using the created framework, and the expert opinion of 
members of the South Dakota Internet Crimes Against Children taskforce (ICAC) and the 
Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI).   
A digital component can be found in nearly every crime committed today.  The Dark 
Web Artifact Framework is a reusable, paperless, comprehensive framework that provides 
investigators with a map to follow to locate the necessary artifacts to determine if the system 
being investigated has been used to access the dark web for the purpose of committing a crime.  
In the creation of this framework, a process itself was created that will contribute to future 
works.  The yes/no, if/then structure of the framework is adaptable to fit with workflows in any 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
Background of the Problem 
The dark web is the hidden part of the internet that is not indexed by search engines and 
is only accessible with a specific browser like The Onion Router (Tor).  Tor was initially 
developed by the US government for private communications and is still widely used by 
individuals all over the world for that purpose.  In addition to private communications, citizens 
around the world access content restricted in their country, or as a way around restricted internet 
sites in North Korea, Iran, or the Great Firewall of China, for example.  In fact, the New York 
Times has had a constant dark web .onion page for years to ensure people all over the world 
can access their site regardless of internet censorship in their home countries.  During the Arab 
Spring, activists utilized Tor to circumvent government restrictions and communicate on social 
media (Cattle, n.d.).  However, the dark web has become synonymous with nefarious and illicit 
content and there are a significant number of .onion sites that sell weapons, drugs, stolen credit 
cards, stolen user credentials, child pornography, alleged murder-for-hire, hackers for hire, 
exotic animals, stolen antiquities, and more (Kohen, 2017).  Given the fundamental goal of 
privacy and anonymity, there are limited techniques for finding forensic artifacts and evidence 
files when investigating misuse and criminal activity in the dark web.  In addition to the built-
in anonymity of the browsers, the landscape of the dark web is constantly shifting with the 
average lifespan of a dark web market being just eight months (Routley, 2018).  Since the dark 
web is not indexed like surface web sites, search engines such as Google, Bing, Yahoo are not 
able to reach these sites.  Finding traces of dark web activity indicating a connection to illegal 
material may be the difference between a suspect being charged with a crime or being allowed 
to go free to continue to commit these crimes.  Therefore, providing evidence that a user has 
accessed dark web market sites to acquire illegal goods or services is valuable to investigators 
of these cases.   
Therefore, the purpose of this design science research is to develop a reusable 
framework to assist digital forensic analysts in acquiring host-based artifacts when conducting 
computer forensic investigations involving suspected dark web criminal activity.  Novel 
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approaches to investigate, acquire, and analyze dark web activity is being sought by agencies 
worldwide.  This chapter is organized as follows: section one details the history of digital 
forensics and lists anti-forensic techniques used to thwart investigators including the use of 
private browsers like Tor.  The creation and evolution of Tor is detailed along with the 
beginnings and history of the dark web.  Understanding what makes Tor anonymous aids in the 
understanding of new and innovative approaches for combating that anonymity when used for 
criminal intent.  The latest research on traces left behind by the use of Tor will be explored and 
will include what can be found after using Tor to access dark web sites in several scenarios.  
The beginnings of the dark web, dark web market sites, and the cycles of these market sites are 
explained.  The problem being addressed by this research is stated with justification supported 
by first person interviews with a United States District Court Judge, a member of the South 
Dakota Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI) who is also a member of the Internet Crimes 
Against Children (ICAC) task force, and a Special Agent with Homeland Security 
Investigations (HSI).  The end of this chapter outlines the objective of this research which is to 
develop a reusable framework to guide investigators when searching for host-based artifacts 
when their investigation is focused on crimes involving suspected dark web activity.  
History of digital forensics 
Although digital forensics is a relatively new field, the use of computers to commit a 
crime is not new.   The first example of password hacking was in 1961 at the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology (MIT) by Allan Scherr (Honan, 2012).  Students were given passwords 
to access shared computers but were given four-hour timeslots.  Frustrated by the short time, 
Scherr created a punch card to trick the computer into printing off all student passwords 
allowing him to login as other students when time ran out.  In 1971, Roswell Steffen embezzled 
over a million and a half dollars from the Union Dime Savings Bank in Manhattan by 
manipulating computer records (Fosburgh, 1973).  Steffen removed funds from accounts and 
covered his theft by making sure to transfer funds from other accounts into the depleted 
accounts when automatic interest payments were due.  Accounts accumulated interest at 
different time periods, so Steffen was able to manipulate the accounts to ensure that each 
account contained the proper amount at the time of interest calculation thereby not alerting the 
acco n  holders of heir deple ed f nds.  S effen s sh ffling of mone  be een acco n s as 
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caught while authorities were investigating an illegal gambling scheme he was part of (Liles et 
al., 2015).   
The advent of the personal computer (PC) in the early 1980s brought computers out of 
labs and companies and into homes.  Early on members of law enforcement recognized that 
these PCs could contain evidence of crimes (M. Pollitt & HisTory, 2010).  Some of these 
individuals included those from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), the United States Secret 
Service, and the Department of Defense who collectively founded the International Association 
of Computer Investigative Specialists (IACIS) in late 1989.  IACIS is the first known 
organization dedicated to digital forensics and evolved out of the Computer Investigative 
Specialist training course offered by the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) 
in New Brunswick, Georgia.  The course later came to be known as Sei ed Comp er and 
Evidence Recover  or SCER and was the first course of its kind to offer training for the 
seizure, examination, and extraction of evidence from computers that had been involved in a 
crime and was a collaborative effort between federal, state, and local law enforcement ( IACIS 
- HisTor ,  n.d.).  Early investigations focused on stand-alone computers running a variety of 
operating systems and were performed on whatever equipment was available.  Early tools used 
by investigators consisted of problem-specific command line tools or commercial data recovery 
tools.  The first commercial software created specifically for digital forensics is believed to be 
SafeBack which was created in 1991 by Chuck Guzis.  At this point in the evolution of digital 
forensics, the primary audience was the law enforcement community (M. Pollitt & HisTory, 
2010).  In the 1990s, officers tasked with performing digital forensic investigations had minimal 
or limited training and no official framework to implement to ensure repeatability in their 
investigation.  As both hardware and software technology evolved to include not only stand-
alone machines but also internet-connected devices, the use of email, and cellular phones 
capable of storing data, the need for specialized tools and training evolved.  EnCase and 
Forensic ToolKit (FTK) are two early commercially developed tools that are now considered 
standards for use in digital investigations.  Open-source tools such as Autopsy and The 
SleuthKit have followed and are two popular options used by investigators ( Pop lar Comp er 
Forensics Top 21 Tools,  2019). 
The evolution of investigations has gone from looking for deleted files on a desktop 
machine that may hold 40 megabytes (MB) of data to searching numerous devices that have 
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multiple connections and within those devices data in various locations.  On a single machine 
an investigator may be looking for email information, database information, log files, memory 
analysis, file analysis including deleted files, graphics and video analysis, internet browsing 
history, and much more on a machine that may hold 10 terabytes (TB) or more of data  
( Ama ing Fac s and Fig res Abo  he E ol ion of Hard Disk Drives - Pingdom Ro al,  
2019).   
 The growth in digital forensics tools and expertise has brought the rise of anti-forensics 
techniques.  In his paper titled Arriving at an anti-forensics consensus: Examining how to define 
and control the anti-forensics problem, Ryan Harris from The Center for Education and 
Research in Information Assurance and Security (CERIAS) at Purdue University describes anti-
forensics as any attempts to compromise the availability or usefulness of evidence to the 
forensics process  (Harris, 2006).  Techniques for anti-forensics include data hiding, wiping, 
obfuscation, storage prevention, and physical destruction.  Types of data hiding include 
encryption, steganography, and storing data in areas of the hard drive that are difficult to find 
such as slack space or alternate data streams.  Wiping techniques include file or disk wiping 
ili ies like Darik s Boo  and N ke (DBAN) or BCWipe, and dega ssing hich ses a 
magnetic field to clean a storage device.  Obfuscation techniques include log alteration or 
deletion, altering metadata, and altering file extensions such as making a .jpg file look like a 
.docx file.  Prevention techniques such as private browsing prevent the saving of browsing data 
like cookies, temporary internet files, and internet history.  Browsers like Edge, Safari, Chrome, 
Opera, Firefox, and Brave do not default to private or incognito browsing.  A browser that does 
do this is The Onion Router (Tor).  When Tor is installed, the default settings are for cookies 
to automatically clear on exit along with your browsing history (Perry, Mike; Clark, Erinn; 
Murdoch, Steven; Koppen, 2018).  A user installing and using Tor with the recommended 
default settings is offered both prevention by not saving browsing information and encryption 
when data is transmitted. 
History of Tor 
Initial work on what later came to be known as Tor began at the United States Naval 
Research Lab (NRL) by David Goldschlag, Mike Reed, and Paul Syverson in 1995.  In 1997 
funding was contributed by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), a 
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Uni ed S a es Depar men  of Defense agenc  hose s a ed mission is o make pivotal 
in es men s in break hro gh echnologies for na ional sec ri  ( Abo  DARPA,  n.d.).  The 
original intent of the project was to protect online communications for United States military 
personnel stationed overseas by preventing the pinpointing of their location using their internet 
protocol (IP) address.  Tor is still used today by law enforcement and intelligence organizations.  
The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) announced in the summer of 2019 its own onion site 
for users to view the CIA website (Hay Newman, 2019).  According to CIA director of public 
affairs Brittany Bram ell, o r global mission demands ha  indi id als can access s sec rel  
from an here  (Central Intelligence Agency, 2019).   
In addition to not saving browsing information and encryption, Tor uses a technique 
kno n as onion ro ing  o send da a from he hos  o des ina ion on a pa h con aining s ops 
along the way.  The origination of data is not known to the final destination, providing 
anonymity with encryption being added to provide privacy.  Normally when a connection is 
made, the host computer makes a direct connection to the destination, so both know each IP 
address.  Tor uses a series of connections, known as nodes, to connect the host to the destination.  
The first step in connecting to the Tor network is the client obtaining a list of Tor nodes from a 
directory server (Figure 1).    
 
Figure 1 - T  c e  b a  a  f de  ( T  P ec ,  .d.) 
During the second step, the client selects a random path to the destination server.  For 
each node the data will pass through, a layer of encryption is added.  Each node has a decryption 
key for only their layer and no other.  
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Figure 2 - T  c e  c  a a d  a  ( T  P ec ,  .d.) 
As each node is reached, it decrypts a layer then sends the data to the next node.  Only 
when reaching the final destination is the data in an unencrypted form.  If the user visits another 
site, another random path is taken to the new destination. 
 
Figure 3 - Another site visit - a ec d a d  a   e ec ed ( T  P ec ,  .d.) 
This layering preserves the privacy of the data preventing eavesdropping.  Additionally, 
each node only knows the node it received the data from and the node it is sending data to, they 
do not know the full path from the host to the destination which prevents traffic analysis and 
creates anonymity (Syverson, 2005).   
The project that started at NRL received the name The Onion Router or Tor when Roger 
Dingledine, a Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) graduate joined Paul Syverson.  
Later both were joined by Nick Mathewson, also an MIT grad.  Tor was released as open-source 
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software and initially had only a few dozen nodes.  In 2004, the trio presented a paper titled 
Tor: The Second-Generation Onion Router stating that in May 2004 the Tor network consisted 
of 32 nodes (24 in the US and 8 in Europe) and several hundred users (Dingledine, Mathewson, 
& Syverson, 2004).  Today, the Tor network consists of thousands of nodes and millions of 
users making it one of the largest anonymity networks ( Welcome o Tor Me rics,  n.d.).  While 
Tor started as a means for secure communication, is has become a network for those who 
believe that all users should have access to a private, uncensored web ( Tor HisTor ,  n.d.).   
Other networks such as Freenet and the Invisible Internet Project (I2P) exist that also provide 
privacy protections.  Of these, Tor is the most popular network so is the focus of this research 
(Negi, 2017).  The original purpose of the Tor network was to provide anonymity and privacy 
and while many valid reasons exist for seeking anonymity, that anonymity also provides a 
platform for those with criminal intent.   
Tor can be installed on Windows, macOS, Linux, and Android systems.  Tor can also 
be used as part of a stand-alone, bootable operating system such as The Amnesiac Incognito 
Live System (TAILS).  TAILS can be booted using either a USB drive or DVD drive and states 
that it leaves no trace on the computer unless the user changes the default settings.  According 
o he TAILS ebsi e, i  does no  se he hos  comp er s hard drive.  TAILS uses the system 
RAM, but the website claims that RAM is automatically erased when the computer powers 
down ( Tails - Pri ac  for an one an here,  n.d.). 
The Dark Web and Dark Web Markets 
The world wide web can be broken down into three layers.  The part of the web that is 
available to the general public and accessible with search engines is known as the surface web 
or the Clearnet.  This area of the web is indexed by search engines such as Google, Yahoo, or 
Bing and have content that can be accessed by anyone.  Below the surface web lies the deep 
web which contains the majority of the world wide web.  The deep web holds information that 
is accessible to a user with the correct credentials.  Email accounts, bank accounts, medical 
records, student records, corporate databases, and cloud data are some examples of deep web 
information that can be accessed but require a link or credentials to ensure the user has the right 
to access that information.  Within the deep web is a small section known as the dark web.  Dark 
web sites require special software to access such as Tor or I2P and have sites that do not use 
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the domain name service (DNS) to resolve easy to remember addresses such as www.espn.com 
or www.dsu.edu but rather have links such as wcgqzqyfi7a6iu62.onion (Tor Project .onion 
Page) or sntfgwfami5fdbn5.onion (Sonic the Hedgehog Gamer Site).   
 
Figure 4 - The World Wide Web 
The beginnings of the dark web can be traced back to March of 2000 and the start of 
Freenet, a peer-to-peer platform for censorship-resistant communication and publishing  
(Moore & Rid, 2016).  The privacy and anonymity of these networks led to the creation of 
marketplaces as a means to exchange illegal and unethical goods.  However, an early obstacle 
of Freenet and Tor networks in the exchange of these illegal materials was payment.  One of 
he firs  dark eb marke places o se he Tor ne ork as The Farmer s Marke .  The si e 
offered various narcotics, including LSD, ecstasy, fentanyl, mescaline, ketamine, DMT, and 
high-end marijuana (Security, 2012).  Transactions were conducted using Western Union, 
Pecunix, PayPal, I-Golder, and in cash making payment difficult and potentially traceable.  The 
Farmer s Marke  as sh  do n in 2012 as par  of Opera ion Adam Bomb and res l ed in he 
arrest of seven U.S. citizens and one Dutch citizen on charges of federal drug trafficking and 
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Figure 5 - I a e f T e Fa e  Ma e  (S c12, .d.) 
The advent of Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies facilitated the growth in these 
underground markets.  The first darknet marketplace to utilize cryptocurrency as a form of 
payment is considered to be the Silk Road, which initially consisted of illegal drugs of varying 
pes.  Crea ed in 2011 b  Ross Ulbrich , a.k.a. Dread Pira e Rober s , he Silk Road as 
ultimately shut down by the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in October 
2013.   Before it was shut down, the Silk Road sold drugs, guns, poisons, and contemplated the 
sale of bodily organs while other items such as stolen personal information, child pornography, 
and counterfeit currency were strictly off limits (Zajácz, 2017).  
 
Figure 6 - Silk Road Anonymous Market (Nimuehr, 2018) 
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When one market shuts down another begins.  Just 35 days after Silk Road was shut 
down Silk Road 2.0 began.  When Silk Road 2.0 was shut down, Silk Road 3.0 launched 35 
days later.  At the time of shutdown of Silk Road there were five other active dark web drug 
marketplaces.  Since then, over one hundred sites have gone online with the average length of 
operation being slightly over eight months (European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug 
Addiction, 2017).  As of the writing of this paper in 2020, there are over twenty current sites 
with the numbers shifting daily.  These markets primarily offer illegal drugs with many more 
sites offering stolen credit cards, PayPal cards, hacking services, stolen credentials, illegal 
pornography, stolen antiquities, exotic animals, and worse (Paul, 2018).  
At the same time as these drug sites were proliferating, sites containing graphic child 
pornography were also growing.  In July of 2013, Eric Eoin Marques was arrested in Ireland 
for operating a dark web site containing over 1.4 million images of child pornography (United 
States Department of Justice, 2019a).  Marques was extradited to the United States in March 
2019 to face federal charges of advertising and distributing child pornography.  The site Playpen 
was launched in 2014 with a user base of over 150,000 people from around the world before 
being shut down in February 2015 (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2017).  While the 
investigation, known as Operation Pacifier, is still ongoing, the FBI listed the arrest numbers 
as of May 2017 as follows: 
 At least 350 U.S.-based individuals arrested 
 25 producers of child pornography prosecuted 
 51 hands-on abusers prosecuted 
 55 American children successfully identified or rescued 
 548 international arrests, with 296 sexually abused children identified or rescued 
(Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2017) 
In 2016, a year after the Playpen site was shut down, a scan of Tor hidden services 
revealed that almost 30 sites related to child pornography remained active (Cox, 2016).  
Convictions related to the Playpen site continue with the most recent as of the writing of this 
paper being September 2019 (Anash, 2019).  Law enforcement has been successful in taking 
down illegal market sites, however more come online in their place.  Several operations since 
the takedown of Silk Road in 2013 have successfully targeted dark web marketplaces.  
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Operation Onymous in 2014, Operation Hyperion in 2016 (Cox, n.d.), Operation Bayonet in 
2017, Operation Disarray in 2018 (Wegberg, Verburgh, Berg, & Staalduinen, 2017), Operation 
SaboTor in 2019 all resulted in seized websites and several arrests ( Feds Disman led he Dark-
Web Drug Trade b  I s Alread  Reb ilding  WIRED,  2019).  The takedown of Wall Street 
Market as a result of Operation SaboTor provided law enforcement with intelligence to pursue 
the drug traffickers on these dark web markets.  Operation DisrupTor was conducted in 2020 
resulting in the arrest of 179 individuals with a seizure of $6.5 million in cash and 
cryptocurrency, approximately 500 kilograms of drugs worldwide (The United States 
Department of Justice, 2020).  In the United States alone there were 274 kilograms of drugs 
seized including fentanyl, oxycodone, hydrocodone, methamphetamine, heroin, cocaine, 
ecstasy, MDMA, along with 63 firearms.   
The dark web is a key search area for open source investigations conducted by firms 
such as the Hetherington Group, a consulting, publishing, and training firm that is a leader in 
due diligence, corporate intelligence, and cyber intelligence.  The founder of Hetherington 
Group, Cynthia Hetherington, MLS, MSM, CFE, CII, stated in a first-person interview that 20 
to 30 percent of her investigations involve the dark web.  According to Hetherington, many 
companies are still struggling to understand the dark web (Hetherington, 2019). 
Statement of the Problem 
Dark web marketplaces are having a regional impact in South Dakota, around the 
country and globally and contribute both to illegal drug usage and child pornography.  Nearly 
every crime committed today contains a digital component.  Criminals who are cautious may 
not leave obvious evidence on their digital devices identifying where or how they acquired 
illegal contraband.  For example, their browser data may contain little information indicating 
criminal activity, they may not store photos of the illegal goods, they may not leave files on 
their system indicating criminal activity.  The built-in anonymity of the Tor browser can give a 
false sense of security to criminals who have knowledge of how to access the dark web.  Finding 
traces of dark web activity indicating a connection to illegal material may be the difference 
between a suspect being charged with a crime or being allowed to go free to continue to commit 
these crimes.  McGregor W. Scott is a United States Attorney for the Eastern District of 
California and prosecutor of several dark web drug cases.  Speaking about the recent case 
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against Marcos Paulo De Oliveira-Annibale of Sao Paulo, Brazil who faces federal drug 
distribution and money laundering charges for allegedly acting as a moderator on dark web 
marketplace Wall Street Market, We are on he h n  for e en he inies  of breadcr mbs o 
identify criminals on the dark web.  The prosecution of these defendants shows that even the 
smalles  mis ake ill allo  s o fig re o  a c bercriminal s r e iden i .  (United States 
Department of Justice, 2019b).  That tiny breadcrumb may be hidden in the mountains of data 
con ained on a s spec s machine.  Digi al forensics was a key component in the evidence 
collected and used to prosecute Ross Ulbricht, creator of the Silk Road dark web marketplace.  
Da a collec ed from Ulbrich s lap op incl ded Bi coin alle s i h 140,000 Bi coins and a lis  
of Silk Road servers (Hayes, 2015).  A reusable, easy to follow framework being designed by 
this research is needed to assist digital forensic analysts in identifying forensic artifacts on a 
Windows or macOS system for the purpose of aiding law enforcement when conducting 
investigations involving dark web criminal activity.    
Regionally, South Dakota has seen convictions of users purchasing illegal drugs on the 
dark web.  A snapshot of these convictions: 
 
x 2018  Four South Dakota men received federal prison charges for purchasing fentanyl 
and cyclopropyl fentanyl on the dark web (KSFY News, 2018). 
x 2019  A South Dakota man was convicted in federal court of purchasing MDMA, also 
known as ecstasy, and other controlled substances from sellers in Europe via the dark 
web for distribution in South Dakota (Epp, 2019). 
x 2019  A South Dakota man was convicted in federal court for purchasing meth online 
and reselling it to others  (Klein, 2019).  
x 2019  A California man is facing conviction for shipping 2.6 million fentanyl pills 
nationwide which included Chamberlain, Mitchell, and Sioux Falls, SD (Kennecke, 
n.d.). 
x 2020  Seven South Dakota residents sentenced to prison for a dark web 
methamphetamine purchase and distribution (Lewis, 2020). 
 
To further establish the impact the dark web is having regionally, first-person interviews 
were conducted with individuals with experience in the criminal justice system in South Dakota.  
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Interviews were conducted with Judge Roberto Lange, Toby Russell and Craig Sherer and are 
outlined below.  These individuals were selected due to their work with dark web cases and 
legal expertise in South Dakota from both a federal and state perspective.  
Judge Roberto (Bob) Lange is a United States District Court Judge from South Dakota 
presiding over the central region.  Judge Lange has been a US District Court Judge since 
November of 2009.  Prior to being named to the judgeship, Judge Lange had 20 years of private 
law practice with Davenport, Evans, Hurwitz and Smith, LLP of Sioux Falls, SD.  Judge Lange 
stated that since he became a US District Court Judge in 2009 that he as probably had 20-30 
cases total come before him that involved the dark web or approximately 2-3 per year.  He 
stated that most do not get tried but rather end in a plea agreement.  Judge Lange indicated that 
the cases he is seeing involving the dark web relate to child pornography.  Judge Lange stated 
that the child pornography cases he has seen routinely involve the dark web and feels that child 
pornography cases are steadily growing and always involve the use of the internet.  The increase 
in accessibility and ubiquitous nature of the internet contributes to this.  Judge Lange indicated 
that the cases that are prosecuted now seem to involve more images than cases 10 years ago 
and that there are more cases overall as when he started he saw 1-2 cases per year and now sees 
2-3 cases per year (Lange, 2019). 
Toby Russell is a Special Assistant to the Attorney General (SAAG) within the South 
Dakota Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI) with 22 years of law enforcement experience 
who has been working internet crimes since 2002 and has been on the Internet Crimes Against 
Children (ICAC) task force since 2007.  SAAG Russell is aware of numerous drug 
investigations in South Dakota that involve the purchase of drugs from the dark web using 
cryptocurrency and being shipped in from overseas and since 2017 there has been an influx 
with more and more individuals discussing getting drugs like heroin through dark web 
p rchases.  SAAG R ssell s e perience with ICAC cases is that the dark web is used as a 
communication platform for individuals seeking child pornography and provides what is 
believed by these individuals to be a secure mechanism for connecting with like-minded 
individuals.  SAAG Russell has seen cases where little evidence remains except for a statement 
from a suspect that they are using the dark web which then leads to a forensic examiner finding 
hese remnan s.  I  is SAAG R ssell s e per  opinion ha  e ill con in e o see an increase 
in dark web activity in South Dakota, particularly in cases of illegal drugs.  In addition, SAAG 
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Russell believes South Dakota will begin to see an increase in illegal weapons and stolen 
property being obtained from the dark web as it is not monitored by law enforcement (Russell, 
2020). 
Craig Sherer is a Special Agent with HSI, a position he has held since December 2004.  
Special Agent Sherer has been involved in local dark web investigations including one which 
resulted in the seizure of approximately 1 kilogram of Methylenedioxymethamphetamine 
(MDMA), commonly known as Ecstasy, along with approximately $36,000 in Bitcoin 
contained on a seized phone.  Special Agent Sherer believes the individuals using the dark web 
to purchase illegal drugs to have enough sophistication to enable them to purchase drugs on 
dark web markets but these users feel secure in the ordering process to not take further 
preca ions o mask heir ac i i ies.  I  is Special Agen  Sherer s e per  opinion ha  dark eb 
crimes will continue to increase in South Dakota as currently investigators have seen an increase 
in the amount of opioid cases with the local street value being higher than the going rate on the 
dark web.  The dark web being a world market drives the prices lower so it can be purchased 
from overseas and then resold locally at a profit (Scherer, 2020). 
The expert opinions of these individuals indicate a growing presence of dark web 
criminal activity.  In addition, previous research has focused on network artifacts or solely on 
Windows-based artifacts.  Therefore, a need exists for identifying host-based artifacts of dark 
web activity in criminal investigations. 
Research Question 
Based on the background information provided in this research regarding the impact of 
dark net markets at not only an international or national but rather local level, the following 
questions will be examined in this research: 
x What host-based artifacts can be identified on a system running either Windows PC 
or macOS when the user has been accessing the dark web using Tor or Tails? 
Objectives of the Project 
The primary objective of this project is to design a framework that can be used by digital 
forensic analysts when searching for host-based artifacts on a computer where the use of the 
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dark web is suspected in the commission of a crime.  Using the open-source OSINT Framework 
as a template to facilitate its use (Nordine, n.d.), this project will create a framework that can 
be used to aid in the search for and identification of artifacts indicative of dark web use for 
criminal intent.  The use of this framework by forensic analysts will provide a roadmap to assist 
in locating dark web artifacts on a system by a user who is a suspect in a criminal investigation.  
These hard to find artifacts aide law enforcement in building a case against a suspect who is the 
subject of an investigation of a crime involving dark web activity. 
Organization of this Paper 
This research is organized as follows.  Chapter 2 presents a review of related and 
relevant literature.  Chapter 3 addresses the design science research methodology used for this 
research and poses the questions that will be answered in the course of this research.  Chapter 
4 describes the design of the Dark Web Artifact Framework.  Chapter 5 is a comprehensive 
treatment evaluation to confirm the validity of the designed framework.  Chapter 6 concludes 
this dissertation and discusses limitations and potential future work. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Introduction 
This chapter reviews existing literature that addresses digital forensics frameworks, 
previous studies regarding identifying dark web artifacts, and discusses the gap that exists in 
both Windows and macOS forensics.  A common theme emerges in the previous studies of 
digital forensics frameworks of collection, examination, analysis, and reporting.  The existence 
and frequency of proposed frameworks demonstrate the acceptance and utility of these 
frameworks in the field of digital forensics.  Studies of dark web forensics have previously 
focused on network forensics to identify the source of dark web sites or to deanonymize users.  
Additional research has been conducted using live memory analysis and host-based artifacts on 
a system running the Windows operating system.  This chapter concludes with the inclusion of 
cryptocurrency as a possible artifact indicative of dark web criminal activity. 
Digital Forensics Frameworks 
Several frameworks or models to assist in digital investigations have been presented 
that outline the overall process for conducting a digital investigation.  These frameworks 
provide a repeatable process that address the key aspects in digital forensics of reliable, 
repeatable, and verifiable results (Forensic Focus, 2012).  Some of these frameworks have many 
phases such as the Enhanced Integrated Digital Investigation Process proposed by 
Baryamureeba and Tushabe in 2004 (Baryamureeba & Tushabe, 2004) which has 21 phases, 
while others have few phases such as the Investigation Framework by Kohn, Eloff, and Olivier 
in 2006 (Kohn, Michael; Eloff, JHP; Olivier, 2006) which has three phases.  The frameworks 
outlined below highlight some of the more cited frameworks that have been presented.  The 
common theme that emerges from these frameworks is the overall process of collection, 
examination, analysis, and reporting.   
One of the first digital forensic models was presented by Special Agent Mark M. Pollitt 
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation at the 18th National Information Systems Security 
Conference in 1995 (M. M. Pollitt, 1995).  Pollitt outlines a four-step process of acquisition, 
identification, evaluation, and admissibility of evidence drawing a parallel to paper evidence.   
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Figure 7 - Approach to Evidence in Cyberspace (M. M. Pollitt, n.d.) 
Pollitt points out that the process of presenting paper evidence is clear and obvious 
because it is visible to the human eye whereas digital evidence requires the use of tools and 
must follow a process that is documented, reliable, repeatable, and presentable to members of 
the court for it to be useful in a criminal case.  Three of the four phases of the process are shown 
to contain both legal and technical aspects.  When acquiring evidence, legal authorization must 
be present before acquisition while searching for that evidence may require technical 
knowledge for manipulating the digital device and determining the location of the evidence.  
Identifying evidence requires technical knowledge of the device and being able to explain 
where the evidence physically and logically resides within the device as well as being able to 
view the evidence in context to ascertain the relevance and meaning.  The example Pollitt gives 
of this is being able to look at data in HEX, ASCII, EBCDIC, or within an application.  Finally, 
evaluation of the data requires both legal and technical judgements.  Conclusions are reached 
when viewing evidence from a technical view of how data was produced, how it was accessed, 
who accessed it, and when it was accessed.  Legally it must be determined if the data is relevant, 
if it is reliable, and if one can testify to it.  Pollitt makes the conclusion that if information is 
not able to be admitted as evidence, then legally it does not exist.  Both law and science must 
be used together to both identify evidence and explain its significance. 
An abstract digital forensics model was proposed in the Fall 2002 edition of the 
International Journal of Digital Evidence by Mark Reith, Clint Carr, and Gregg Gunsch (Reith, 
Mark; Carr, Clint; Gunsch, 2009).  The goal of this model was to provide a standardized method 
for digital investigations without making it tool-specific. Rei h, Carr, and G nsch s model 
draws on previous models and includes nine key steps of identification, preparation, approach 
strategy, preservation, collection, examination, analysis, presentation, and returning evidence.   
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Figure 8 - Abstract Digital Forensics Model (InfoSec, 2016) 
The model allows for expansion into sub procedures as needed, giving the example of 
including sub procedures under the examination category of volatile and non-volatile storage.  
The authors include both advantages and disadvantages of their proposed model.  One point 
that is included as both an advantage and a disadvantage of their model is the generalized 
methodology.  It is an advantage as it provides the ability to relate a technical process to the 
non-technical observer, however the authors acknowledge that the proposed model may be too 
general to be of practical use. 
Based on the model proposed by Reith, Carr, and Gunsch a framework for collecting 
digital evidence was proposed in 2004 by researchers Brian Carrier and Eugene Spafford 
(Carrier & Spafford, 2004).  Carrier and Spafford created an event-based framework based on 
procedures used when investigating a physical crime scene.   
 
Figure 9 - Carrier and Spafford Graphic Representation of the Major Categories of Phases in the Framework (Carrier & 
Spafford, 2004) 
This framework includes five phases focusing on the overall picture of gathering digital 
evidence.  Included are phases for readiness, deployment, physical crime scene investigation, 
digital crime scene investigation, and finally presentation.  The readiness phase ensures the 
appropriate training, tools, and equipment configuration are prepared for the investigation.  The 
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deployment phase is when incidents are detected, confirmed, and the proper authorization for 
investigation is obtained.  The physical crime scene investigation phase is the identification of 
devices at a crime scene that may contain digital evidence.  The collection of these devices 
leads to the digital crime scene investigation phase.  The digital crime scene investigation phase 
is further segmented to include system preservation and documentation, evidence searching and 
documentation, and event reconstruction and documentation.  The final stage is presentation 
where the results are presented either to a corporate audience or to a court of law.  This model 
proposed by Carrier and Spafford provides a high-level overview of a digital investigation, 
however lacks specific details of an investigation. 
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Guide to Integrating 
Forensic Techniques into Incident Response released in 2006 describes a basic forensic process 
of collection, examination, analysis, and reporting (Kent, Chevalier, Grance, & Dang, 2006).  
 
Figure 10 - NIST Basic Forensic Collection (Kent et al., 2006) 
In this guide, the forensic process is described as a way to transform media into evidence.  
Collection of data includes identifying any possible media sources that may contain data both 
obvious and nonobvious.  Obvious sources of data include items located in the physical area 
including desktops, laptops, thumb drives, CDs, cell phones, digital cameras, and volatile data 
contained on a system that is running.  Nonobvious sources may be located in other locations 
and include logs from an internet service provider (ISP), information recorded by other 
organizations, or laptops owned by employees rather than the organization.  Nonobvious 
sources may require court orders or have other legal constraints to consider.  After data has 
been identified it needs to be acquired from the source in a three-step process.  A plan is devised 
to acquire the data, the data is acquired, and the data is verified to ensure integrity.  All steps 
need to be performed in a manner that supports any future legal action.  The next phase of the 
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forensic process is examination which transforms the media into data.  Relevant information is 
extracted from the media that has been collected using available tools and techniques, for 
example determining the type of file being examined or using text or pattern search techniques.  
The analysis phase takes the data extracted during examination and transforms it into 
information.  Analysts study the data from all available sources looking for connections 
between people, places, and events.  The final phase of reporting takes the information obtained 
from the analysis phase and presents it as evidence.  A final step in the reporting phase includes 
identifying any policy or procedural deficiencies that exist that can be remedied before the next 
event.   
A more extensive framework produced by the Department of Justice by Ovie L. Carroll, 
Stephen K. Brannon, and Thomas Song of the Cybercrime Lab Computer Crime and 
Intellectual Property Section (CCIPS) is the Digital Forensic Analysis Methodology (Oliver, 
Brannon, & Song, 2008).  The methodology includes a flowchart detailing the 
preparation/extraction, identification, and analysis phases of their overall forensic process.  The 
overall process includes the steps of obtaining and imaging forensic data, the forensic request, 
preparation/extraction, identification, analysis, forensic reporting, and case-level analysis.  The 
flowchart details the middle three steps of the process and is shown in Appendix A. 
The chart follows steps of a yes/no, if/then process for each stage with a Return on 
Investment strategy of determining when to stop the process.  Five lists are included with the 
flow chart that are referenced at various stages during the process.  Search leads, extracted data, 
relevant data, new data source leads, and analysis results are included in the framework with 
examples of how they are used and room for messages or notes.  While progressing through the 
flowchart there are references to using each list.  For example, during the preparation/extraction 
phase after selection of the appropriate forensic tool the requested data is extracted and added 
o he Prepared/E rac ed Da a Lis .  Follo ing he addi ion o he Prepared/Extracted Data 
Lis  he da a search lead is marked as processed on he Da a Search Lead Lis .  The 
preparation phase starts with determining whether there is sufficient information to start the 
process.  The following steps of the preparation phase is the setup and validation of forensic 
hardware and software, choosing the appropriate forensic tools, extracting the data, and 
determining whether all relevant data has been processed.  The identification phase starts where 
the preparation phase ends, with determining whether all relevant data has been processed.  If 
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so, the identification phase continues leading to the analysis phase.  If not, then a decision is 
made of what type of item has not been processed, whether it is relevant to the request that was 
made and whether it is within the scope of the warrant pertaining to the case.  The analysis 
phase determines if there is sufficient data to be analyzed or if more data is needed.  The analysis 
phase covers the who, what, where, when, and how of the data being analyzed.  Other associated 
artifacts such as registry entries and metadata are considered which may indicate links to other 
items or events.  Findings are documented on a timeline or other forms and the reporting process 
begins.  The entire process can loop back to a previous phase at the identification, analysis, or 
case-level analysis phases to repeat if needed to provide more information. 
The E plore, In es iga e and Correla e  (EIC) frame ork as presen ed a  he 2010 
International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security by Grant Osborne, Benjamin 
Tunstill, and Jill Slay of the University of South Australia (Osborne, Turnbull, & Slay, 2010).   
 
Figure 11 - EIC Framework Overview (Osborne et al., 2010) 
The EIC frame ork is described b  he a hors as a high-level conceptual framework 
o address iss es s rro nding scalabili  and comprehension of digi al e idence .  The goal of 
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the EIC framework was to use visualization of information to streamline the processes and tasks 
of locating digital evidence in the growing number of devices and the complexity of devices in 
a manner that is scalable to the ever-increasing storage capacity of these various devices that 
investigators encounter.  Visualization of information is a computer-aided, interactive, 
graphical representation of data (Ware, Mire, Kuniavsky, & Snyder, n.d.).  It is a way for 
investigators to visually see and interpret relationships and concepts within vast amounts of 
data that may not otherwise be apparent.  The EIC framework consists of three main phases of 
explore, investigate, and correlate.  The explore phase is the identification of the types of data 
that are included and to provide an overview of the data as it relates to the crime being 
investigated.  The investigate phase includes zooming in on data and filtering data to refine the 
data.  Keyword searches are performed, event data is examined which includes file creation, 
modification, and deletion, and entities such as unique users or applications are identified.  
Visualization of these events aids in determining connections between events and entities.  
From this information a timeline of events can be established.  The correlate phase combines 
the overview visualizations from the explore phase with the more focused visualizations of the 
investigate phase including evidence from all sources for correlation.  Overall the EIC 
framework aims to be scalable to large amounts of data and to enable investigators to 
incrementally build a visual, presentable view of data that can help reduce the complexity of 
presenting findings from diverse sources. 
The number of existing digital forensics frameworks demonstrates that they are an 
accepted practice in the field of digital forensics that enable analysts to conduct thorough 
investigations.  Additionally, they provide the repeatable process that addresses the key aspects 
in digital forensics of reliable, repeatable, and verifiable results.  Each of these frameworks 
outline the overall forensic process in a similar way with each presenting a slightly different 
approach.  The research proposed in this study uses a comprehensive, reusable framework to 
enable analysts to find artifacts indicative of dark web criminal activity to aide in the 
prosecution of crimes committed using the dark web.  
Dark Web Forensics 
Previous studies regarding identifying dark web activity have centered around 
identifying users on the Tor network by utilizing techniques that de-anonymize these users at 
23 
the entry or exit nodes of the network.  While they are difficult to exploit, vulnerabilities do 
exist in the Tor browser that can result in the de-anonymization of users (Jacoby MenTor & 
Chow, 2016).  Two extremely unlikely scenarios are collecting data by controlling all of the 
nodes on a circuit used or controlling only the entry and exit nodes used by a particular user.   
There have been instances of malicious scripts being used to infect computers of visitors of the 
dark web that cause identification of those users.  An example of this is he FBI s sei re of he 
dark web hosting service Freedom Hosting in which the FBI placed malware on the servers that 
then infected the users visiting the Freedom Hosting sites that held child pornography allowing 
the FBI to identify those users (Poulsen, 2013). 
The Washington Post reported on a paper written in 2006 for the National Security 
Agenc s (NSA) Cr p anal sis and E ploi a ion Ser ices classified as Top Secret but shown 
on The Washington Post web page (The Washington Post, n.d.).  The goal of the research was 
to review the Tor source code to search for vulnerabilities.  The paper discusses using traffic 
analysis techniques, including tracing circuits, and was described as an unrealistic, but powerful 
attack using technology available at the time.   
In addition to Tor, dark web sites can be accessed using other methods.  The Amnesic 
Incognito Live System (Tails) is designed to be a live, bootable operating system that can be 
run from most computers by using either a USB drive or a DVD ( Tails - Privacy for anyone 
an here,  n.d.).  Little academic research has been done on Tails.  Tails comes with Tor 
installed and also gives the option to use the Invisible Internet Project (I2P), an alternate 
anonymous network, rather than Tor  (Cardenas-Haro & Dawson, 2016).  Tails claims to 
provide privacy and to leave no trace on the system it is booted to, however errors by users can 
lead to the loss of privacy.  Users who download files, bookmark sites, or install browser plug-
ins run the risk of leaving traces on the device they are booting from whether it is a USB or 
DVD. 
Anonymous browsing is also possible using other operating systems that have been 
developed with the intention of secure, anonymous communication.  Whonix is an operating 
system designed to run within a virtual machine (VM) and was developed to use the Tor 
network.  It is based on the Debian operating system with multiple layers of virtual machines 
and comes with pre-installed, pre-configured applications ( Whoni ,  n.d.). 
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In addition to the Tor network, other dark web networks exist that require a different 
method of access.  A forensic analysis case study has been done on the Invisible Internet Project 
(I2P) network, a dark web network similar to, but different from Tor (Bazli, Wilson, & Hurst, 
2017).  I2P ses eepsi es  ra her han he .onion addresses ha  are sed b  Tor.  The study 
discusses the difficulties in detecting I2P installation and use on a host machine.  Commercial 
forensic software packages such as EnCase and FTK are not able to analyze or detect I2P 
artifacts or I2P activity.  With modifications, detections are possible by using hash detection 
from the installer files for I2P. 
Freenet is network that uses a peer-to-peer (P2P) architecture whose design intention 
as he pre en ion of censorship  and main enance of pri ac  (Miller, Hong, Wiley, 
Sandberg, & Clarke, 2002).  Users of Freenet dedicate some of their own storage space by 
running a node on the network.  Files stored on Freenet sites are stored on multiple computers 
so if one user node is not available a file can still be retrieved through a different node.  Evidence 
of a Freenet installation on a system is available, however the files are encrypted so their 
contents are unknown. 
Memory analysis and Registry file analysis was explored in a study published in 2015 
by researchers at Marshall University working with members of the West Virginia State Police 
Digital Forensics Unit.  Together they published a paper in which they used a combination of 
host-based forensics and network forensics to identify artifacts indicating dark web use (Darcie, 
Boggs, Sammons, & Fenger, 2015).  Using RAM dump analysis, Registry file analysis, and 
packet capture the researchers were able to find useful information in each area they searched.  
A limitation they acknowledged was the use of RAM analysis on a live machine.  This is not 
always an option for law enforcement as the state of the machine is not always controllable.  
Additionally, Registry file analysis showed that Tor had been used but no specific browsing 
activity.  The existing research done by Marshall University and the West Virginia State Police 
provides a foundation for this proposal that would be expanded upon further.  
An August, 2017 article for the International Journal of Emerging Trends & Technology 
in Computer Science (IJETTCS), Dr. Digvijaysinh Rathod proposes a framework for dark web 
forensics (Dr. Digvijaysinh Rathod, 2017).  Dr. Ra hod s proposed frame ork is a broad 
overview of categories broken down into Tor forensics and Bitcoin forensics.  Tor forensics 
includes random access memory (RAM) forensics, Windows Registry changes, network 
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forensics, and database information.  Bitcoin forensics includes an analysis of Bitcoin wallets.  
Dr. Rathod s frame ork pro ides a good s ar ing poin  for a frame ork and s gges s ools o 
be used but lacks specific information for locating the proposed categorical artifacts. 
Recent research performed on a Windows 8 virtual machine included analyzing Tor 
artifacts including memory, hard disk, and system registry with the Tor browser open and closed 
revealing several artifacts (Jadoon, Iqbal, Amjad, Afzal, & Bangash, 2019).  The study largely 
involved normal user activity with little connection to dark web sites but rather connected to 
Clearnet sites through the use of the Tor browser.  The research by Jadoon, et.al. would provide 
additional foundation for this proposal.  A  he ime of his research, here asn  a 
corresponding study for Windows 10.  Research on artifacts on a Windows 10 operating system 
focused on Tor artifacts found when Tor is installed but did not include visits to dark web sites 
(Warren, 2017).    
Dark web investigations often include detecting traces of cryptocurrency use as it is the 
payment method for transactions made on dark web marketplaces.  Artifacts are left behind 
when users install the software required to have a bitcoin wallet (Wadas, 2018).  Directories, 
subdirectories, and file names are able to be located on a system image.  File directories are 
crea ed in a ser s personal folder nder AppDa a\Roaming\Bitcoin i h s bfolders of blocks, 
chains a e , and da abase .  Also incl ded in he Bi coin folder are he files .lock , db.log , 
deb g.log , peers.da , and alle .da .  Researchers a  he University of Luxembourg, 
Qatar Computing Research Institute, and Qatar University performed analysis on Bitcoin 
transactions using a combination of open source intelligence (OSINT) and blockchain 
transactions to link 125 unique users to dark web hidden services.  Their conclusion was that 
users that use Bitcoin as a payment method on dark web marketplaces can be deanonymized 
(Al Jawaheri, Al Sabah, Boshmaf, & Erbad, 2020).   
Conclusion 
There are many existing frameworks for digital forensics which demonstrates their 
value to the field.  These existing frameworks provide a foundation for the framework proposed 
for this research.  Collection, examination, analysis, and reporting are common categories that 
are included in these frameworks and are important to digital investigations to ensure that 
findings are considered usable evidence.  These frameworks help to provide reliable, repeatable, 
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and verifiable results.  Research has previously been done to deanonymize Tor usage to detect 
users who are visiting dark web sites, however rather than viewing artifacts left behind on a 
host these have focused on network monitoring.  In addition, users paying for dark web 
purchases with Bitcoin who also publicly share their wallet addresses on social media are able 
to be deanonymized which also does not focus on host-based artifacts as this research will.  
Previous research has also focused on artifacts left behind on Windows systems including live 
memory analysis and host-based analysis including Windows Registry changes as a result of 
dark web activity.   The research proposed in this study will expand upon live memory forensics, 
Windows Registry modification, and include any newly identified artifacts to create a reusable, 
comprehensive framework for identifying artifacts on a host machine that has been used to 
access the dark web for criminal intent. 
Further, this research will abstract away from a particular operating system thereby 
extending its applicability to other operating systems such as macOS.  While Windows holds 
the majority of the market share of operating system use, macOS is the second leading operating 
system and appears to be growing (Net Marketshare, n.d.).  This proposal will consolidate and 
combine existing knowledge with any newly discovered artifact locations including both 
Windows and macOS operating systems to create a comprehensive, reusable, multi-use 
framework that will provide investigators an avenue for discovering useful artifacts on a system 
used to access dark web sites for criminal intent.  
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CHAPTER 3. RESEARCH METHODOLOG  
Introduction 
This chapter explains the research method chosen and the steps that will be taken to 
complete this research.  Research methodology is the process followed by a researcher to solve 
the proposed problem (Rajasekar, Philominathan, & Chinnathambi, 2014).  It provides a 
systematic approach of steps to walk through while studying the research problem (Kothari, 
2004).  The purpose of this study is to develop a usable framework for identifying host-based 
artifacts during a digital forensic investigation involving suspected dark web use.  The dark web 
is shrouded in anonymity and is heavily encrypted.  Both of these traits, along with the general 
mystery surrounding the dark web, lend itself to criminal activity.  Accessing the dark web 
requires the use of a special browser such as The Onion Router (Tor).  While other browsers 
exist, at this time Tor is the most popular so has been chosen for this research ( Ho  o Access 
the Dark Net and Deep Web Safely - S ep b  S ep G ide,  n.d.).  The Tor homepage, 
www.Torproject.org, states the purpose of Tor as: Browse Privately, Explore Freely, and defend 
against tracking and surveillance ( Tor Projec ,  n.d.).  The default setting for Tor is to clear 
cookies upon exit and delete any browsing history.  The intentions of The Tor Project and 
default settings make finding host-based artifacts difficult, but not impossible. 
Upon completion, the expected result of this research is a reusable, comprehensive 
framework that is easy to follow and assists investigators in finding artifacts that are designed 
to be hidden or otherwise hard to find.  The contribution of this framework will assist 
investigators in identifying evidence in cases where the user is suspected of accessing the dark 
web for criminal intent when little or no other evidence of a crime is present. 
Research Method 
This research will implement design science to create an artifact to meet a specific goal.  
Design science focuses on creating something with a specific purpose in mind to add value or 
improvement (March & Smith, 1995).  According to Alan Hevner, distinguished university 
professor and eminent scholar at the University of South Florida, the goal of design science is 
utility (Hevner, March, Park, & Ram, 1996).  Design science projects employ the design cycle 
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which is a smaller portion of the overall engineering cycle (Wieringa, 2014).  The design cycle 
includes problem investigation, treatment design, and treatment validation.  An artifact is 
created to treat the identified problem in order to meet the goals of people who have a vested 
interest in the project, known as stakeholders.  It is an iterative cycle where implementation 
evaluation determines the level of success of the treatment implementation and may lead to the 
beginning of a new design cycle if improvements are desired.  Implementation evaluation and 
problem investigation both are the start of new cycles.  While problem investigation is the start 
of a new cycle seeking improvement on the problem, implementation evaluation is a 
continuation of the cycle started during problem investigation with the goal of evaluating how 
effective the treatment is after it has been applied to the identified problem. 
 
Figure 12 - Engineering Cycle (Martakis, 2015) 
Problem Investigation 
Problem investigation in design science focuses on improving upon a problem and the 
reasons that it is important.  Real-world design problems are addressed through design and 
investigation of the problem and are driven by the goals of both the researcher and the 
stakeholders.   
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Figure 13 - Implementation evaluation (Martakis, 2015) 
These stakeholders are those who are affected positively or negatively by the treatment 
of the problem.  Stakeholders have varying degrees of awareness and interest in the problem 
being addressed and therefore have different desires.  At the lowest level a stakeholder may be 
unaware that a problem exists, has input no thought or resources to the treatment of the problem, 
but would be affected by the treatment of the problem.  At the highest level a stakeholder is 
fully aware that a problem exists and has invested thought and resources to addressing the 
problem.  Stakeholder goals are defined as desires that the stakeholder has invested resources 
toward, either time or money, to achieve the desired outcome (Wieringa, 2014).  Stakeholders 
who have not invested resources may still be affected by the treatment, but do not contribute to 
the goals of the research. 
For this research, the problem is identified as finding host-based dark web artifacts that 
indicate criminal activity and can be used as evidence when the software used to access the dark 
web is designed to leave little trace behind.  Crimes committed on the dark web are problematic 
for law enforcement.  Criminals using the dark web rely on anonymity and encryption to stay 
hidden.  The dark web, including dark web markets and cryptocurrency payments, are not 
widely understood by many law enforcement agencies.  National law enforcement agencies 
such as the FBI work to identify users with the goal of shutting down the marketplaces and have 
achieved some success.  Following multi-agency Operation Marco Polo that resulted in the 
takedown of the Silk Road marketplace in 2013 there have been several more multi-agency 
operations between the FBI and other U.S. and international agencies to shut down dark net 
marketplaces.  These operations include: 
x Operation Onymous in 2014 - that arrest of 17 individuals and take down several 
online marketplaces (Décary-Hétu & Giommoni, 2017) 
x Operation Hyperion in 2016  targeted vendors and users (Cox, n.d.) 
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x Operation Bayonet in 2017  took down two leading darknet marketplaces Alphabay 
and Hansa (Wegberg et al., 2017) 
x Operation Disarray in 2018  targeted vendors and users (FBI, 2018) 
x Operation SaboTor in 2019 (U.S. Attorne s Office, 2018)  
x Operation DisrupTor in 2020 (The United States Department of Justice, 2020) 
Despite these successes, several dark net markets continue to operate.     
Locally however, law enforcement lacks the training and resources to find the source of 
these marketplaces but rather do have the ability to have an impact on the destination of dark 
web contraband.  An impact can be made by assisting local investigations in finding evidence 
of dark web use.  The primary stakeholders of this research are identified as the investigators 
trying to solve crimes committed using dark web sites such as buying illegal drugs, identity 
theft, weapons, terrorism, illegal pornography, and other criminal material.  Additional 
stakeholders would be individuals who are victims of the crimes that are committed.  These 
victims include: 
x victims of violent crimes committed using weapons purchased on the dark web 
x victims who have their identity stolen 
x victims who have their bank accounts or credit cards compromised 
x victims of human trafficking or otherwise used to produce child pornography 
x victims of overdose caused by drugs purchased on the dark web 
x healthcare organizations that are treating patients who overdose on drugs purchased 
on the dark web 
x the families of all of these victims who are helping their loved one recover from any 
of these crimes 
Research Questions 
John W. Creswell is an academic who has written numerous journal articles and several 
books on research and research methods ( Bio  John W Cres ell,  n.d.).  Creswell states that 
research q es ions narro  he p rpose s a emen  for research and become major signposts for 
readers  (Creswell, 2014).  Design science uses knowledge questions that must be answered 
and are either analytical or empirical.  Analytical questions are answered by analyzing collected 
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data while empirical questions are answered through observation and experience.  The main 
empirical knowledge question that is the focus of this research is What host-based artifacts 
can be identified on a system running either Windows PC or macOS when the user has been 
accessing the dark web using Tor or Tails?   To assist in answering this main question, follow-
up questions can be asked such as: 
x What methods or tools are used to remain anonymous when accessing the dark web? 
x What additional steps are users taking to further obfuscate their dark web activity? 
x What traces of Tor remain in the Windows Registry after use?  
Is it possible to find what sites were visited while using Tor? 
x If a system is booted with a TAILS USB drive that supposedly leaves no trace, will any 
traces of having booted to a USB remain? (Can BIOS memory be read to do this?) 
The development of the proposed artifact, A Framework for Identifying Host-Based 
Artifacts in Dark Web Investigations, by gathering information from previous works conducted 
in the topic, through the investigations of existing tools, through information gained from 
interviews with investigators of dark web crimes, through the advice of experts in the field and 
the demonstration of the use of the artifact will answer these questions.   
Artifact Design 
Artifact design begins by specifying the requirements of the proposed artifact that meet 
the goal of the stakeholders.  The requirements are design decisions determined and argued by 
the researcher as a method for contributing to the goals of the stakeholders. The absence of 
currently available solutions brings the need for new artifacts to address the identified problem.  
Previous research will be utilized that focused on Windows system memory and Windows 
registry analysis (Darcie et al., 2015).  This will be combined with research conducted that 
located Tor remnants on a Windows 8 system (Jadoon et al., 2019) using Tor to visit Clearnet 
sites and research on a Windows 10 system that installed Tor but visited no dark web sites.  
These together as well macOS system artifacts, for which no previous research was located, 
will create one comprehensive framework. 
The requirements for the proposed framework are as follows: 
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o Easy to follow  the framework must be easy for investigators to follow so as to 
not inhibit their investigation by requiring more effort than what is gained in 
useful evidence. 
o Consider Windows and other operating systems  it is possible for investigators 
to receive multiple pieces of digital evidence when investigating a crime.  
Windows and macOS are the two most common desktop operating systems, 
therefore both will be explored for this research (Net Marketshare, n.d.). 
o Consider multiple ways to access the dark web using Tor.  Tor can be installed 
on a hard drive, run from a flash drive, or run as part of the bootable TAILS 
operating system.  All three methods of access need to be explored. 
o Be adaptable to future platforms. 
 
Meeting these requirements would contribute to the goal of finding usable evidence of 
dark web criminal activity by considering the different avenues the dark web can be accessed.  
For the identified problem in this research, there is currently existing research that explores 
artifacts left behind by the Tor browser bundle including memory dump analysis seeking Tor 
artifacts (Dayalamurthy, 2013).  Existing research also examines forensic artifacts produced by 
the use of Bitcoin or other cryptocurrencies (Doran, 2014) (Wadas, 2018).  MacOS and Linux 
RAM have been analyzed using the Volatility framework to produce artifacts not found in non-
volatile storage (Richard & Case, 2014).  Digital forensic frameworks have been presented 
using traditional physical crime scene procedures as a model (Carrier & Spafford, 2004).  
Where the research appears to be lacking is combining all of these together to establish a unique 
framework for examining a static system, non-volatile as well as volatile memory looking for 
Tor artifacts, Bitcoin or other cryptocurrency signs, and web-based artifacts.  An established, 
easy to follow framework will assist investigators in narrowing their search when faced with 
terabytes of data providing a roadmap to follow for finding usable forensic artifacts. 
The following systems will be used for testing purposes for this study: 
x Fujitsu Lifebook laptop PC, model T725 with a clean version of Windows 10 
installed 
x Apple MacBook Pro, model A1502 laptop with a clean version of macOS installed  
x Newly created TAILS bootable USB drive with version 4.3 installed 
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x Tor installed on a new, unused SanDisk 64 GB USB drive 
First, the Windows machine will be imaged using FTK Imager and the macOS machine 
imaged with Macquisition to produce a baseline image to ensure any data found during the 
examination stage is created during testing rather than residing on the system.  RamCapturer 
for the Windows machine and Macquisition for the macOS machine will also be run to set a 
baseline on both volatile and static memory (PAGEFILE.SYS in the case of Windows).  The 
open source tool Regshot will also be run on the Windows machine to get a baseline Windows 
registry snapshot.  Regshot is a tool that can monitor Windows registry changes.  Once each 
baseline has been created, each system will individually be booted using the TAILS operating 
system, Tor opened, several sites which will be documented accessed both on the Clearnet and 
dark web before exiting TAILS.  Each machine will be restarted upon exit of TAILS and a 
memory capture performed to determine if any residual trace resides after using TAILS.  A 
second image will then be captured on each machine to determine what, if any, traces of having 
used Tor and visited dark web sites remains.  Regshot will be run on the Windows machine 
again to get a registry snapshot to compare to the initial. 
Second, each machine will be booted into the installed operating system (PC or iOS) 
and the Tor browser bundle will be started from a USB drive.  Several sites will be visited, 
including Clearnet and dark web sites before exiting Tor.  System memory will be captured 
using RamCapturer for the Windows operating system and Macquisition for the macOS 
operating system.  A system image will be created using FTK Imager for the Windows 
operating system and Macquisition for the macOS system.  Regshot will also be run on the 
Windows machine again to get another snapshot for comparison to the original.  Once 
completed, each machine will be powered off to erase any volatile memory retained by the 
system. 
Third, each machine will download and install the Tor browser bundle locally, then 
started.  Several sites will be visited, including Clearnet and dark web sites before exiting Tor.  
System memory will be captured using RamCapturer for the Windows machine and 
Macquisition for the macOS machine and a system image created using FTK Imager for the 
Windows machine and Macquisition for the macOS machine.  Regshot will again be run on the 




Extraction and Analysis 
The software used to perform forensic extraction and analysis: 
x Forensic Toolkit (FTK) Imager 
x Macquisition 
x RamCapturer  
x Forensic Toolkit (FTK)  
x Magnet Axiom 
x Regshot 
Step Activity Tool or technique 
1 Baseline Image FTK Imager/Macquisition 
 Baseline Memory Capture  Volatile and Non-Volatile Ram Capturer/Macquisition 
 Beginning Windows Registry Snapshot Regshot 
 Boot to TAILS Tor opened, both Clearnet and 
dark web sites visited and 
authenticated, sites bookmarked 
 Second Memory Capture Ram Capturer/Macquisition 
 Second System Image FTK Imager/Macquisition 
2 Boot to Operating System (Windows 10 and macOS) Tor opened from USB drive, 
both Clearnet and dark web sites 
visited 
 Memory Capture Ram Capturer/Macquisition 
 System Image FTK Imager/Macquisition 
 Windows Registry Snapshot Regshot 
3 Boot to Operating System (Windows 10 and macOS) Tor opened from desktop, both 
Clearnet and dark web sites 
visited 
 Memory Capture Ram Capturer/Macquisition 
 System Image FTK Imager/Macquisition 
 Windows Registry Snapshot Regshot 
Table 1 - Research Steps 
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The captured images at each stage of research will be examined with both FTK and 
Axiom as each forensic software has advantages and strengths. 
Framework Creation 
Using the structure of the open-source OSINT Framework created by Justin Nordine, a 
reusable framework will be created that will allow investigators to click through a pathway to 
locate the artifacts they are seeking.  Using the OSINT Framework is a mechanism for 
displaying and using the proposed framework rather than creating a paper-based framework to 
follow.   A basic starting point of this framework is shown in Figures 15-19.  The branching of 
the framework will be determined by the operating system being used; macOS, Windows, or 
Tails.  Once the operating system is chosen further branching will indicate whether Tor is 
installed locally on the hard drive of the system or if it is started from a removable USB drive 
while booted into the operating system.  Upon the selection of the mechanism for starting Tor, 
further branching will be revealed to indicate areas to being searching such as PAGEFILE.SYS, 
Windows Registry, or the SQLite database PLACES.SQLITE which stores bookmarks, 
favorites, and browsing history.  Indications of cryptocurrency may be found in any of the above 
locations and will warrant branching from the main line.  Further branching will be added 














































Figure 15 - Framework showing options of Windows PC, macOS, and TAILS 




Figure 18 - Further branching of TAILS showing it being run on both Apple and PC hardware. 
Figure 17 - Further branching from macOS showing Tor installed locally vs Tor run from a USB drive 
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Expected Contribution 
Today, nearly every crime has a digital component.  Investigators invest their time in 
these cases in an attempt to solve serious crimes.  The goal of these stakeholders is to find 
usable evidence of dark web activity to assist their investigations.  Digital evidence can be 
found in different locations depending on the operating system being used and the method of 
accessing the dark web.  Windows stores information differently than a macOS system.  
Accessing the dark web using Tor installed on a hard drive leaves different traces than using 
Tor from removable storage.  The ultimate goal of this research is to provide investigators with 
a method that considers both operating systems and multiple methods for accessing the dark 
web to maximize the amount of evidence located.   
The artifact created for this design science research will be a reusable, comprehensive 
framework for investigators to follow to find usable evidence that may be hidden in the vast 
amounts of data they may be searching.  Rather than simply displayed in paper form, this 
framework will utilize the existing structure of the OSINT Framework created by Justin 
Nordine (Nordine, n.d.) which is available as open-source software on GitHub.  The underlying 
design of the OSINT Framework will be modified to create a paperless framework that can be 
installed for the user.  Design science is the most appropriate method for this type of research 
project as it focuses on creating an artifact, a framework to follow, to solve the problem of 
locating evidence of dark web use on a computer that may contain terabytes of data.  The use 
of the open source software that was the basis for the OSINT Framework is simply a tool to 
facilitate the use of the artifact, the created framework. 
Treatment Evaluation 
Treatment evaluation studies the designed artifact to determine if the effects of the 
artifact meet the requirements specified by the researcher and ultimately contribute to the goal 
of the stakeholders.  According to Hevner et al., “A design artifact is complete and effective 
when it satisfies the requirements and constraints of the problem it was meant to solve.  (Hevner 
et al., 1996). 
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Figure 19 - Treatment validation (Martakis, 2015) 
To ensure the validity of the process created during this design science project the 
following steps will be taken.  First, experimental evaluation will be conducted using a 
simulation of the proposed framework.  A clean system will be given to a voluntary user to 
access dark web content using each of the three methods described above accessing several 
dark web sites.  After the completion of each method, the created framework will be used by 
an investigator to identify artifacts generated as a result of this dark web use.  Second, the image 
file from a previously worked dark web case will be used both with and without the framework.  
A comparison will be made using metrics such as total time for the analyst, ease of finding 
artifacts, and error rate such as false positives and false negatives.  Third, the expert opinion of 
members of the South Dakota Internet Crimes Against Children taskforce (ICAC) and the 
Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI) will be sought.  DCI and ICAC investigators 
investigate many crimes including illegal drug purchases and child pornography.  These agents 
analyze numerous systems and have expert knowledge of the evidence needed to charge and 
ultimately aid in convicting criminal suspects. 
The framework created will demonstrate success during both validation steps as artifacts 
of dark web activity can be located on the test systems.  These artifacts would include, but are 
not limited to, items such as .onion sites found in memory analysis, bookmarked sites in SQLite 
databases, and Windows registry changes indicating the installation and use of the Tor browser 
bundle. Identifying .onion sites in memory will aid investigators in knowing which dark web 
sites the suspect is visiting.  Sites bookmarked in Tor or Tails stored in the SQLite database 
PLACES.SQLITE give indications of the favorite markets or forums of the user.  Windows 
registry changes indicate when the suspect first installed Tor and when it was last used or 
possibly deleted.  Indications of cryptocurrency use in memory, wallet keys, or bookmarked 
favorites contributes to the evidence of dark web use as cryptocurrency is the payment method 
during dark web transactions.  Success of this framework will provide artifacts to investigators 
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that will contribute to the evidence in cases where there is suspicion of a crime being committed 
by using the dark web. 
Timeline 
The following timeline includes steps already completed, steps in process, and steps 
proposed to complete this research.   
 
Figure 20 - Timeline 
Limitations 
A limitation of this study is that this is covering only artifacts that are left on a host 
while using the Tor browser to access the dark web.  Other software exits for accessing dark 
web sites including I2P and Freenet, however, Tor is the most popular browser used to access 
the dark web ( 5 Dark Web Bro sers for Deep Web Bro sing in 2018,  n.d.).  Network 
forensics can be used to attempt to identify users of the Tor network by monitoring entry or exit 
nodes.  Attempts can also be made to exploit vulnerabilities in the Tor browser to identify users 
of the Tor network and therefore expose their use.  Both of these techniques are beyond the 
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This chapter addresses the methodology to be used to complete this research project.  
Design science research focuses on the creation of an artifact to address and add value to a real-
world problem.  The dark web is not well understood by law enforcement.  It provides both 
anonymity and encryption which often leads to criminal activity such as illegal drug purchases 
and child pornography.  The purpose of this research is to produce an artifact that is a framework 
for digital forensic investigators of dark web crimes to follow to assist in locating evidence on 
a host-based system.  The data gathered for this research will use both a PC laptop with 
Windows 10 installed and an Apple Laptop with macOS.  Testing will be done to locate dark 
web artifacts if Tor is installed locally or if Tor is run from a USB drive.  TAILS operating 
system will be tested by on Apple hardware and PC hardware.  Validation for this research will 
be sought from South Dakota ICAC task force and DCI investigators.  The ultimate goal of the 
artifact designed for this research would be to assist law enforcement in their investigations of 
dark web crimes by providing an easy to follow framework for locating evidence of dark web 










CHAPTER 4  ARTIFACT DESIGN 
This chapter discusses the creation of the framework using the methodology described 
in Chapter 3 to answer the questions posed to facilitate the design.  The Dark Web Artifact 
Framework, found at https://arica-kulm.github.io/Dark-Web-Artifact-Framework/, was created 
using the open source OSINT Framework by Justin Nordine as a template (Nordine, n.d.).  
When opening the framework, circles in blue indicate further branching while circles in white 
represent URL links in most cases.  Starting with each operating system, the branching begins 
with a decision of whether Tor was installed locally or from a USB or secure digital (SD) card.  
If Tor was installed locally, the next branching provides options for whether Tor is still installed 
or has been deleted from the system.  The Tails branch provides steps for an investigator to 
follow to first determine whether or not there is persistent storage on the imaged Tails drive.  If 
persistent storage exists, steps are provided for attempting to decrypt and reimage to identify 
artifacts that the user saved.  The Dark Web Artifact Framework contains branching for each 
option that was researched with the end branch containing a link to a URL for further 
information on that particular artifact.  An effort was made to avoid sites that were for 
commercial purposes or user forums in favor of those that contain articles or other useful 
information.  Sites that link to commercial sites link to those that contain blogs or other helpful 
information and are not a link to a tool or product.  The sites referenced are not intended to be 
academically rigorous.   
The default preferences for security and privacy in Tor were not changed for this 
research.  Users have the option to use a master password which enables saving logins and 
passwords, site history can be remembered, and the security level can be changed to a different 
level.  None of those options were changed from their defaults, but rather used as installed.  The 
artifacts listed in the Dark Web Artifact Framework ma  no  al a s be fo nd on a s spec s 
system and there may be additional artifacts that are not included in this framework.  Both 
Windows PC and macOS operating systems were booted using a USB drive with Tails installed, 
used with the Tor Browser launched from a USB drive, and used with the Tor Browser installed 
locally.  Separate USB drives were used for booting to Tails and separate USB drives were used 
for each operating system when the Tor Browser was launched from the USB.  Each operating 
system has unique artifacts that remain after using the Tor Browser either locally installed or 
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launched from a USB drive or SD card.  Artifacts were also gathered both with the Tor Browser 
still installed on the local system and again after it was deleted.  The purpose of this research is 
not to compare the number of artifacts found for each operating system, but rather to identify 
what artifacts are found leaving quantification to future research.   
Anonymizing Methods or Tools 
What methods or tools are used to remain anonymous when accessing the dark web? 
Tor or another anonymizing browser is required to access the dark web.  As outlined in 
the introduction, Tor uses a series of relays to avoid detection and tracing ( Tor Projec ,  n.d.).  
It is important to emphasize that methods to remain anonymous when accessing the dark web 
are differen  depending on he ser s in en .  Remaining anon mo s o he si e being connec ed 
o is differen  han lea ing no race on he ser s hos  system.  The goal of the Dark Web Artifact 
Framework is to determine host-based ar ifac s, so he ser s anon mi  o he si e being 
connected to is not within the scope of this research.  Refining the question being asked is 
necessary to fit the scope of his frame ork.  The q es ion hen becomes, Wha  me hods or 
tools are used to minimize any trace of host-based artifacts on the system used to access the 
dark eb? .  There are a arie  of a s his can be accomplished and is largel  de ermined b  
the sophistication of the user.  The methods used for this research included Tor run from within 
the stand-alone operating system Tails, Tor installed on a removable drive such as a USB drive 
and launched after booting into the operating system, and Tor being installed and launched 
locally.  All of these methods were performed both on a macOS and a Windows PC computer.  
There are other methods that can minimize the host-based artifacts that would remain on a 
system, such as running Tor in a virtual machine, that were not tested for this research.  Using 
these methods, the artifacts that remain under each circumstance were documented and used to 
create a clickable, reusable framework.  The artifacts are described below and displayed in 
screenshots of the created Dark Web Artifact Framework.  Dots on the framework that are blue 
indicate there is further branching while dots that are white indicate either a stopping point or 




Tor Installed Locally 
The Tor Browser is available to be installed on different platforms and in 32 different 
languages.  Tor is available for Windows, OS X, Linux, and Android ( Tor Projec ,  n.d.).  The 
Tor Project website indicates the safest way to download the Tor Browser is directly from their 
website, however they acknowledge it may not always be accessible if it is blocked by the 
network of the user.  Other alternatives include mirror sites or GetTor ( Tor Projec   Wha  is 
Ge Tor?,  n.d.).  GetTor is a service that automatically responds to user requests for a link to 
download the Tor Browser from hosted locations such as DropBox, Google Drive, and GitHub.  
GetTor can also provide the Tor Browser via email or via Jabber.  On a Windows system the 
downloaded file is an .exe file, on macOS it is a .dmg file.  Launching the downloaded file 
initiates the install just as other software is installed.  The user has the option to change the 
default install location, however for this research the defaults were accepted.   
Windows Local Install 
Installing Tor onto a Windows computer places the Tor Browser onto the Windows 
desktop which puts the files in the /Users/<user profile>/Desktop/ file path.  This local install 
of the Tor Browser also leaves artifacts in many other locations.  Below shows the branching 
of the framework with Tor installed locally while still installed on the system. 
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Figure 21  Windows Tor Local Still Installed 
Launch Location 
In addition to the location of the Tor Browser install files which contains the executable, 
LNK files and other files needed to run Tor, there are several artifacts showing the launch 
location of Tor including:  
- SRUM Application Resource/Network Usage - SRUDB.dat  
- Windows Defender logs  MPLog*.log 
- Amcache Registry hive files  Amcache.hve 
- Event logs  Application.evtx, Security.evtx, Microsoft-Windows-Security-
Mitigations%4KernelMode.evtx, and other .evtx files 
- Prefetch Files  firefox.exe*.pf, tor.exe*.pf, svchost.exe*.pf, and other prefetch 
files 
- UsnJrnl  a journal file used in Windows New Technology File System (NTFS)  
- $LogFile  NTFS logging file 
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Figure 22  Launch Location Artifacts 
Tor Install Browser Artifacts 
 The Tor Project URL with the Tor executable file indicating that the Tor Browser was 
downloaded is found and is dependent on the browser used.  For Internet Explorer and older 
versions of Edge it will be in WebCacheV01.dat file, for Chrome and newer versions of Edge 
it will be found in an SQLite History file within the Edge/Default folder. 
.onion sites 
Artifacts remain for .onion sites that were bookmarked or add-ons that were installed 
for .onion sites.  Places.sqlite contains Tor bookmarks with titles stored in the 
MOZ_BOOKMARKS table and the corresponding .onion site is stored in both the 
MOZ_ORIGINS table and MOZ_PLACES table.  Artifacts left behind in the places.sqlite file 
are dependent on whether or not the user creates a bookmark for a site.  Users who are 
knowledgeable or cautious may not bookmark sites in Tor, leaving no artifacts behind in 
places.sqlite.  Add-ons are found in the extensions.json file found in the Tor Browser install 
location ( Find and ins all add-ons o add fea res o Firefo   Firefo  Help,  n.d.).  Like 
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bookmarks, if users do not install any add-ons there will be no artifacts from dark web sites in 
the extensions.json file. 
Memory Capture 
A capture of system memory either while the computer is still running after having 
accessed the dark web, or after a restart, reveals artifacts of .onion sites, images from dark web 
sites, and LNK files indicating where the Tor Browser was launched from.  Capturing memory 
after the computer has been used to access the dark web, but prior to a restart, contains the most 
artifacts.  Restarting or shutting down the computer removes the artifacts that are left in volatile 
memory; however, artifacts may remain in the pagefile.sys or hibefil.sys files.  Artifacts that 
can be found include .onion site names, images from dark web sites visited such as 
marketplaces, and Tor Browser icons.  URLs to dark web sites are generally not obvious in 
determining whether the site that was visited is nefarious.  To aid in determining what sites 
have been accessed, using Magnet AXIOM forensic software or another forensics tool, a report 
can be created by exporting the evidence found in either a comma-separated value (CSV) file 
or an Excel spreadsheet file for further searching to determine the site contents. 
Registry Files 
There are multiple locations in the Windows Registry that contain artifacts from Tor 
Browser.  These are addressed in an upcoming question specific to the Windows Registry. 
Downloaded Images 
Images that are downloaded from sites while using the Tor Browser are saved to the 
ser s Do nload folder. 
Windows Timeline Activity 
The ActivitiesCache.db file contains the URL of the Tor Project download site along 
with the location the Tor Browser install executable file that was downloaded which can 
indicate which user downloaded the file. 
macOS Local Install 
Installing the Tor Browser on macOS requires downloading the .dmg file.  Once 
launched, Tor Brower is installed when the user drags it to the Applications folder or other 
location ( Ho  o: Use Tor on macOS  S r eillance Self-Defense,  n.d.).   
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Figure 23  macOS Tor Installed Local Artifacts 
 
Tor Browser Files  User 
In addition to the Tor Browser application files that are installed, files that are installed 




Figure 24  macOS Tor Browser User Files Artifacts 
Tor Browser Download 
macOS contains an Application Support folder for users that contains support files for 
running an application.  For the Tor Browser, the TorBrowser-Data folder is created and 
contains the supporting files for running the Tor Browser. 
Tor Icons 
Images from the Tor Project website can be found in the WebKitCache folder for the 
user who installed the Tor Browser.  
Safari History 
Safari his or  is loca ed in he ser s \Library\Safari folder and includes files that 
contain links to the Tor Project website.  The Downloads.plist file for the user contains the URL 
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of the TorBrowser.dmg file and includes the date and time the file was downloaded.  History.db 
contains a link to the Tor Project site including the \download\ folder.  RecentlyClosedTabs.plist 
also contains a link to the Tor Project website \thank-you\ page. 
Preference Files 
Tor Browser information is found in .plist and other files in the \Library\Preferences\ 
folder including dock items in the com.apple.dock.plist, quarantined files in 
com.apple.LaunchServices.QuarantineEventsV2, and volume and device identifier information 
in com.apple.finder.plist. 
Saved Application State 
The Saved Application State is a macOS feature that saves the open screens of an 
application when the application is terminated ( Con rolling Sa ed Applica ion S a es - 
kr p ed,  n.d.).  The user profile \Library\ folder contains an entry for 
org.torproject.torbrowser.savedState. 
Var Folders 
The \private\var\ contains both file system event files and daily log file with Tor 
Browser artifacts.  The daily log file, daily.out, contains disk usage and network information 
( Mac OS Dail  Logs  Sal  Forensics,  n.d.).  The file system events files provide file and 
folder modification and creation information and contains several references to the Tor 
Browser. 
KnowledgeC 
The knowledgeC.db file contains an event log of processes that run within an Apple 
device.  The ZOBJECT table within knowledgeC.db contains a type called App/InFocus that 
shows the date and time an application is being used ( Kno ledge is Po er! Using he 
macOS/iOS knowledgeC.db Database to Determine Precise User and Application Usage  
mac4n6.com,  n.d.).   
.onion sites 
Artifacts remain for .onion sites that were bookmarked or add-ons that were installed 
for .onion sites on a computer running macOS as they are on a computer running Windows.  
places.sqlite contains Tor bookmarks with titles stored in the MOZ_BOOKMARKS table and 
the corresponding .onion site is stored in both the MOZ_ORIGINS table and MOZ_PLACES 
table.  Artifacts left behind in the places.sqlite file are dependent on whether or not the user 
51 
bookmarks sites.  Users who are knowledgeable or cautious may not bookmark sites in Tor 
leaving no artifacts behind in places.sqlite.  Add-ons are found in the extensions.json file found 
in the Tor Browser install location ( Find and ins all add-ons to add features to Firefox | Firefox 
Help,  n.d.).  Like bookmarks, if users do not install any add-ons there will be no artifacts from 
dark web sites in the extensions.json file. 
Downloaded Images 
As they are on a computer running Windows, images that are downloaded on a computer 
r nning macOS from si es hile sing he Tor Bro ser are sa ed o he ser s Do nloads 
folder.  
Memory Capture 
A memory capture of a computer running macOS that has used Tor to access the dark 
web is similar to a computer running Windows.  macOS does not contain the pagefile.sys file 
like Windows but does contain a swap file.  Artifacts such as .onion addresses, Tor icons, and 
images from dark web sites are all found. 
Launching Tor from Removable Media 
Installing Tor onto a removable drive such as a USB drive or SD card places the Tor 
Browser install files onto the USB drive or SD card rather than the local hard drive of the 
computer that Tor is launched from.  Users may incorrectly think that doing this leaves no 
artifacts, however that is not accurate. Launching Tor from a USB drive or SD card leaves 
artifacts on the computer and on the USB drive or SD card. 
Windows - Tor Run from USB 
Many of the same artifacts that are found when Tor is installed locally are found when 
Tor is launched from a USB drive or SD card such as the launch location, user information, and 
downloaded images.  Additionally, information about the USB drive or SD card that launched 




Figure 25 - Windows Tor from USB (SD Card) 
Artifacts Found on Windows Hard Drive 
Launch Location 
The location Tor was launched from is found in multiple artifacts similar to Tor being 
installed locally on the hard drive.  This is significant when running Tor from a USB drive or 
SD card as there will not be an installed program on the hard drive, it can be clearly shown 
where Tor was launched from.   
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Figure 26 - Windows Tor from USB (SD card) Launch Location Artifacts 
The launch location of Tor is found in the following: 
- SRUM Application Resource/Network Usage - SRUDB.dat  
- Windows Defender logs  MPLog*.log 
- Event logs  Security.evtx and Microsoft-Windows-Security-
Mitigations%4KernelMode.evtx 
- UsnJrnl  a journal file used in Windows New Technology File System (NTFS)  
User Information 
The Windows timeline activity file ActivitiesCache.db contains information on the user 
that launched Tor.  This file also shows the location Tor was launched from so could also be 
included in the launch location section of the framework, however, to avoid redundancy it is 
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included in this user information section.  The Windows Shellbags file, usrclass.dat, also 
indicates which user launched Tor. 
 
Figure 27 - Windows Tor from USB (SD card) User Information Artifacts 
USB (SD Card) Information 
Information about the USB or SD card that was used to launch Tor including the make, 
model, and serial number is found in the Windows Prefetch files for TOR.EXE, FIREFOX.EXE, 
and may be found in other prefetch files such as SVCHOST.EXE.  The Windows compatibility 
appraiser also contains USB or SD card make and model information. 
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Figure 28 - Windows Tor from USB (SD card) USB Information 
Registry Files 
There are multiple locations in the Windows Registry that contain artifacts from Tor 
Browser.  These are addressed in an upcoming question specific to the Windows Registry. 
Downloaded Images 
The default for images that are downloaded from sites while using the Tor Browser 
when launched from a USB drive or SD card is the ser s Do nload folder ra her han o he 
USB drive or SD card. 
Artifacts Found on USB Drive or SD Card 
If the USB drive or SD card is located, it can be shown through the artifacts on the 
computer and the USB drive or SD card that it had previously been used to launch the Tor 
Browser.   
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Figure 29 - Windows Tor from USB (SD card) - USB (SD card) Artifacts 
The artifacts found on the USB drive or SD card include the following: 
- Tor Files  the Tor Browser installation files 
- .onion sites  places.sqlite file contains bookmarked sites 
- USB serial # - he Start Tor Browser.lnk  file con ains he serial n mber of he 
USB drive 
- Firefox Add-ons  extensions.json file contains any add-ons the user has 
installed 
Memory Capture 
A memory capture of a computer that has run Tor from a USB drive or SD card is similar 
to installing and launching Tor locally.  Capturing the memory after the computer has been used 
to access the dark web but prior to a restart contains the most artifacts.  A capture of system 
memory either while the computer is still running after having accessed the dark web or after a 
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restart reveals artifacts of .onion sites, images from dark web sites, and LNK files indicating 
where the Tor Browser was launched from.   
macOS Tor Run from USB or SD Card 
Similar to launching Tor from a USB or SD card when using Windows, launching Tor 
from a USB while running macOS leaves artifacts on the hard drive, the USB drive, and in 
system memory. 
 
Figure 30 - macOS Tor from USB (SD card) 
Artifacts Found on macOS Hard Drive 
The artifacts found on the macOS hard drive including artifacts connected to the Tor 
Browser, artifacts containing information related to the USB drive used to launch of Tor, and 





Figure 31 - macOS Tor from USB (SD card) HD Image 
Tor Browser Data / User Info 
Running Tor from a USB drive or SD card still places files for running Tor Browser in 
the Application Support folder like it does when installing Tor locally.  The Application Support 
folder resides within the user profile indicating the user that launched Tor Browser.  Artifacts 
also remain for preference files, the saved application state, and var folders when launched from 




Figure 32 - macOS Tor from USB (SD Card) HD TorBrowser-Data/User Info 
USB Drive or SD Card 
Information about the USB drive or SD card used to launch Tor Browser can be found 
in the CurrentPowerlog.PLSQL file, specifically the 
PLPeripheralAgent_EventForward_DeviceState table. 
Additional Obfuscation Steps 
What additional steps are users taking to further obfuscate their dark web activity? 
Using Tor itself is an obfuscation technique, however users who are using Tor with 
criminal intent may seek further methods of ensuring their activities are hidden.  As stated in 
the previous question, Tor can be run from both a USB drive or SD card inserted into the 
computer, locally installed onto the hard drive of the machine being used, or as part of a 
bootable operating system.  Users may incorrectly assume that by running Tor from a USB 
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drive or SD card that their system is safe since they are not installing to the local drive.  Any of 
these methods can leave behind artifacts either on the host machine or on the method used such 
as a USB drive, SD card or the drive used to run Tails.   
Users who install Tor locally on their system may delete Tor.  The directions for 
removing Tor from a system can be located in the Tor Browser manual found on the Tor Project 
website ( UNINSTALLING  Tor Projec   Tor Bro ser Man al,  n.d.).  These directions call 
for the user of a Windows system to simply delete the folder or application and empty the trash.  
On a macOS system the directions are similar, move the application to Trash, then locate the 
~/Application Support/ folder, look for TorBrowser-Data folder, move it to Trash, then empty 
he rash.  The ebsi e no es ha  he opera ing s s em s s andard nins all  ili  is no  sed 
( UNINSTALLING  Tor Projec   Tor Bro ser Man al,  n.d.).  Users who are rushed or do 
not fully complete either of these instructions can miss the step of emptying the trash or deleting 
the TorBrowser-Data folder, so in creating this framework both the Application Support folder 
on macOS and the Recycle Bin on a Windows machine were incorporated into the possible 
locations for artifacts.   
Users may take further steps of obfuscation such as clearing cache and cookies to 
remove any trace of having downloaded and installed Tor or using a cleaning program such as 
CCleaner ( CCleaner.com - Wha  is CCleaner?,  n.d.) to remove unwanted files and browsing 
history.  None of these options were performed during the creation of the framework so as to 
provide the most possible locations that artifacts could be found on a system. 
Windows Local Install  Tor Deleted 
Uninstalling Tor from a Windows system by following the recommendation on the Tor 
Project website removes the Tor.exe executable file, places.sqlite, extensions.json file, and 
other files contained within the TorBrowser folder but most of the other artifacts remain.   
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Figure 33 - Windows Local Tor Deleted Launch Location 
If the system has not been shut down, a memory capture may still contain .onion sites, Tor 
Browser icons, and images of dark web sites.  A user who wants to remove any trace of having 
downloaded, installed, and launched Tor will need to take extra steps beyond the 
recommendations. 
macOS Local Install  Tor Deleted 
 The instructions on the Tor website for removing the Tor Browser from a macOS system 
are similar to removing Tor from a Windows system.  Deleting Tor according to the directions 
leaves many artifacts behind on macOS.  Like Windows, the places.sqlite, extensions.json, and 
other files that reside within the Tor Browser user files are deleted. 
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Figure 34 - macOS Local Install Tor Deleted Tor Browser Files-User 
What traces of Tor remain in the Windows Registry after use?  
Is it possible to find what sites were visited while using Tor? 
This becomes two separate questions as it is possible to find sites that were visited using 
Tor, however they are not necessarily connected to the Windows Registry.  The first question 
is: 
Windows Registry Artifacts 
What traces of Tor remain in the Windows Registry after use? 
Two of the three methods tested for this research, both running Tor from a USB drive 
or SD card and installing it locally on to a Windows PC, leave traces in the Windows Registry.  
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Booting to Tails happens before the locally installed operating system boots, so using Tails does 
not leave traces in the Windows Registry. 
Tor USB Install 
Installing Tor onto a USB drive, then launching Tor from a Windows PC host machine 
leaves several artifacts in the Windows Registry.  Artifacts for both Tor and the USB drive that 
was inserted can be identified.   
 
Figure 35 - Windows Tor from USB (SD Card) HD Registry 
Several artifacts of the Tor Browser are found in the NTUSER.DAT file for the user who 
launched Tor in the SOFTWARE key including PropertyStore, AppBadgeUpdated, 




Figure 36 - Windows Tor from USB (SD Card) NTUSER.DAT 
USB drive or SD card information is found in several areas of the Windows Registry 
including the SYSTEM key, SOFTWARE key, and registry log files.  The make, model, and 
serial number of the USB drive can be found in these entries.  On their own, the make and 
model of USB drive does not definitively prove that the USB drive or SD card in question was 
used to start Tor.  However, if the USB drive or SD card is also found with the computer in 
question it can be definitively linked by locating the serial number on the USB drive and 





Figure 37 - Windows Tor from USB (SD Card) USB Registry SYSTEM 
The SOFTWARE key, registry log files, and Amcache hive files also contain indicators of USB 




Figure 38 - Windows Tor from USB (SD Card) USB Registry Artifacts 
Tor Local Install 
Installing Tor locally on a Windows PC system leaves traces of Tor in both the 
SYSTEM registry file and the NTUSER.DAT file of the user who installed Tor.  This is true 




Figure 39 - Windows Tor Local Registry 
 
Figure 40 - Windows Tor Local Registry SOFTWARE 
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Figure 41 - Windows Tor Local Registry SYSTEM 
Both still installed and uninstalled, Tor artifacts remain in multiple locations in the 
SOFTWARE key of the NTUSER.DAT file of the user who installed Tor.  
The second question is: 
Dark Web Site History 
Is it possible to find what sites were visited while using Tor? 
The way Tor is used is relevant when locating host-based artifacts on a system that has 
been used to access the dark web. As stated in the beginning of this chapter, for this research 
the default settings of Tor were not changed.  Changing the settings can alter the security of 
what Tor saves.  As installed, Tor allows for bookmarking websites and enabling add-ons which 
leave artifacts behind in the places.sqlite and extensions.json files.   
 
Figure 42 - places.sqlite 
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If the sites being bookmarked are dark web sites, they can be identified by investigators.  
The presence of the places.sqlite database file is dependent on where Tor was launched from 
and whether or not the user has deleted Tor from the system.  Tor launched from a USB drive 
will leave the places.sqlite database file on the USB drive rather than on the hard drive of the 
system.  If Tor has been deleted from the system, it may no longer be on the system or may 
show as a deleted file.  
Add-ons that the user installs while using the Tor Browser will be found in the 
extensions.json file, found in the same location as the places.sqlite file. 
 
Figure 43 - Windows .onion Locations 
 
Figure 44 - macOS .onion Locations 
Memory Capture 
A memory capture of a system that has been accessing the dark web also can reveal 
traces of sites that were visited and images of both Tor and those sites.  Each operating system 
revealed dark web artifacts in memory.  The number of artifacts is dependent on whether or not 
the system has been shut down for a significant amount of time after the dark web site was 
accessed, however traces can still remain in the pagefile.sys of a Windows system.  Artifacts 
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that can be found in memory include .onion sites, images from dark web sites, and Tor icons.  
The operating system and whether or not Tor was launched from a USB drive or SD card or 
installed locally are less important than if the system was shut down. 
 
Figure 45 - Memory Capture Artifacts 
Images that may be recovered include logos from dark web sites as shown below for Empire 
Market, Tor Browser icons, and images downloaded from dark web sites. 
 
Figure 46 - Memory Images 
Tails 
If a system is booted with a Tails USB drive that supposedly leaves no trace, will any traces 
of having booted to a USB remain?  
The Tails website states that using Tails leaves no trace on the computer (Abraham, Silva, 
Decourcy, & Cardon, n.d.).  This was confirmed during this research on both the Windows PC 
and macOS systems independently.  The hard drive of each system was imaged immediately 
prior and again immediately after booting to the Tails USB drive resulting in matching hash 




Figure 47 - Windows PC Hard Drive Image Hash Verification Prior to Tails 
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Figure 48 - Windows PC Hard Drive Image Hash Verification After Tails 
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Figure 49 - macOS Hard Drive Image Hash Verification Prior to Tails 
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Figure 50 - macOS Hard Drive Image Hash Verification After Tails 
Tails contains an option to create persistent storage if it is started from a USB drive.  The 
information stored on persistent storage can include documents, email, chat sessions, and other 
software information.   Tails warns about the security implications of creating persistent storage 
with the persistent storage being protected by a passphrase.  As with other passwords or 
passphrases, the simpler the password the easier it is to compromise.  When imaging a USB 
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drive that has an installation of Tails with persistent storage enabled, it may not be obvious to 
investigators that the drive potentially contains a significant amount of evidence.  Creating an 
image of the Tails USB drive using FTK Imager produces an image with both a Tails partition 
and a TailsData partition (see below).   
 
Figure 51 - TailsData Unrecognized File System 
The TailsData partition is seen as an Unrecognized file system in FTK Imager requiring an 
examiner to follow additional steps to read the data that has been stored in persistent storage.  
Tails persistent storage is encrypted using LUKS encryption as can be seen below in the Hex 
view of the Unrecognized file system.   
 
Figure 52 - LUKS Encryption Indicated 
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Being able to read the data stored within the persistent storage partition is wholly dependent on 
he e aminer ei her kno ing he ser s passcode or being able o crack he passcode i h a ool 
such as Hashcat.   
A Tails USB drive from a user that sets a complicated passphrase is unlikely to provide 
any useful evidence to an investigator.  With a known or simple passphrase, an investigator has 
several steps to go through to export, decrypt, and perform further steps to eventually be able 
to examine the data and information contained within the persistent storage.  The created Dark 
Web Artifact Framework provides steps and links to further information to walk an examiner 
through these required steps in order to reveal the hidden information. 
 
Figure 53 - Tails Initial Branching 
Upon acquiring the Tails USB, the examiner first images the drive using FTK Imager or similar 
imaging ool.  The q es ion is hen Does he dri e con ain encr p ed s orage? .    
 
Figure 54 - Tails Encrypted Storage 
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A user who has not enabled encrypted storage will leave no evidence on the USB drive so the 
investigation of the drive would stop.  The presence of encrypted storage would then move the 
investigator forward to the next step of exporting the unrecognized partition as a raw .001 image 
file using FTK Imager.   
 
 
Figure 55 - Tails Export Unrecognized Partition 
Once the image is exported, it needs to be decrypted before it can be examined.  Tails uses 
Linux Unified Key System (LUKS) encryption to encrypt the persistent storage partition ( Tails 
- Pri ac  for an one an here,  n.d.). 
 
Figure 56 - Tails Decrypt, Mount, Copy, Reimage 
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A tool that decrypts LUKS partitions is the cryptsetup utility for Linux.  The .001 raw image 
file is then copied to a Linux machine to perform the decryption.  If the password is known the 
decryption steps can move forward.  If the password is not known a utility such as Hashcat can 
be used to attempt to obtain the password ( hashca  - advanced pass ord reco er ,  n.d.).  Once 
decrypted, the image can be mounted for viewing in Linux.  To perform a full forensic exam 
the decrypted image is copied back to the original forensics workstation and processed with 
FTK.  Artifacts that are recoverable include bookmarks in the places.sqlite file, which will show 
sites that the user has saved including dark web sites.  Nm-system-connections shows Wi-Fi 
connections that the Tails drive has connected to and includes the Wi-Fi password.  Other 
artifacts include Pidgin log files which contain internet chat sessions, thunderbird email, and 
stored passwords. 
 
Figure 57 - Tails Process Decrypted Image with FTK 
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Host-based Artifacts 
The i a  e i  f hi  e ea ch  be ed i  c ea i g he f a e k i  Wha  h -
based artifacts can be identified on a system running either Windows PC or macOS when 
he e  ha  bee  acce i g he da k eb i g T   Tail ? .   
This question has largely been answered by the answers to the previous questions.  Both 
Windows and macOS systems have numerous artifacts left behind when using Tor to access 
the dark web whether launched from a USB, run locally, or run locally and deleted.  As stated 
earlier, the purpose of this research was not to compare the number or type of artifacts left 
behind on each system, but rather to provide a framework for identifying these artifacts on each 
system.  The location of Tor, how it was launched, when it was downloaded and installed, the 
user who downloaded and installed Tor, and many other artifacts remain.  Proving the user of 
Tor was accessing the dark web rather than using Tor for another purpose narrows the artifacts 
to the places.sqlite file, extensions.json, and system memory.  The memory artifacts can be 
dependent on whether or not the system has been powered down, whether or not a pagefile.sys 
on Windows or swapfile on macOS is configured. 
Accessing the dark web using a Tails drive leaves no host-based artifacts on the 
computer that launched Tails, however if the Tails drive is found, the persistent storage 
container may reveal many dark web artifacts.  
Conclusion 
This chapter discusses the creation of the framework using the questions posed in the 
methodology described in Chapter 3.  Users may install Tor in different ways to try to remain 
anonymous when accessing the dark web.  Tor can be installed locally, installed on a USB drive 
or SD card, or run from within a bootable operating system such as Tails.  Depending on the 
sophistication of the user, artifacts can be left behind in each case on both Window and macOS.  
Further efforts to hide these artifacts include the user deleting Tor after it has been installed 
locally which also leaves behind many artifacts.  Traces in the Windows registry can be found 
whether installed locally or run from a USB drive.  Running Tor from within a bootable 
operating system like Tails leaves no trace on the user s hard dri e; ho e er, if he dri e is 
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found it may be possible to locate artifacts if the user has enabled persistent storage.  Traces of 
dark web sites can be found in both the places.sqlite file and system memory. 
The Dark Web Artifact Framework contains branching for each of these options along 
with links to more information on the particular artifact.  Though the framework is detailed and 
comprehensive, the artifacts listed in the Dark Web Artifact Framework may not always be 
fo nd on a s spec s system and there may be additional artifacts that are not included in this 
framework.  
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CHAPTER 5  TREATMENT EVALUATION 
This chapter discusses the steps taken to evaluate the created Dark Web Artifact 
Framework.  Treatment evaluation in design science research studies the designed artifact to 
determine if the effects of the artifact meet the requirements specified by the researcher and 
ultimately contribute to the goal of the stakeholders.  Three separate evaluation steps were 
undertaken to accomplish the evaluation of the created framework.   
First, experimental evaluation was conducted using a simulation of the proposed 
framework.  A volunteer user was asked to generate dark web history on both a macOS laptop 
and a Windows laptop by launching Tor locally on one machine, launching Tor from a USB 
drive on the alternate machine, and launching Tails on either machine to create persistent 
storage. 
Second, the image file from a previously worked dark web case was used with the 
framework and compared to the original investigation.  This particular case involved a suspect 
who had launched Tor from a SD card and accessed the dark web.  A comparison was made in 
the type and overall quantity of artifacts that were discovered as well as connecting the SD card 
to the comp er o f r her sho  he ser s in en .   
Third, the expert opinion of a member of the South Dakota Internet Crimes Against 
Children taskforce (ICAC) and the Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI) was sought.  DCI 
and ICAC investigators analyze numerous systems and have expert knowledge of the evidence 
needed to charge and ultimately aid in convicting criminal suspects. 
The goal of these evaluations is to ensure that the requirements of this researcher were 
met in the design of the created framework.  The requirements as stated in Chapter 3 are as 
follows: 
o Easy to follow  the framework must be easy for investigators to follow so as to 
not inhibit their investigation by requiring more effort than what is gained in 
useful evidence. 
o Consider both Windows and macOS operating systems  it is possible for 
investigators to receive multiple pieces of digital evidence when investigating a 
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crime.  Windows and macOS are the two most common desktop operating 
systems, therefore both need to be explored (Net Marketshare, n.d.). 
o Consider multiple ways to access the dark web using Tor.  Tor can be installed 
on a hard drive, run from a flash drive, or run as part of the bootable TAILS 
operating system.  All three methods of access need to be explored. 
o Be adaptable to future platforms. 
The three evaluation steps outlined above when combined meet the stated requirements.  
The steps performed in this evaluation and the steps that were met are outlined below. 
Simulation of Proposed Framework 
The Dark Web Artifact Framework meets all four of the requirements set forth by this 
researcher.  First, both a macOS laptop and Windows PC laptop were reset to factory settings 
to remove any personal files and a clean operating system installed.  Next, for each operating 
system, two new, unused USB drives were created with Tor Browser installed.  Last, a new, 
unused USB drive was used to create a Tails bootable operating system.  The two laptops, two 
Tor USB drives, and Tails USB drive were given to a volunteer user to generate dark web data.  
The volunteer user was given the instructions to choose one machine to launch Tor from the 
provided USB drive, choose the other machine to download and install the Tor Browser, and to 
boot to Tails creating persistent storage.  The investigator had no knowledge of which machine 
was used for each purpose and was left to determine the details during the investigation using 
the created Dark Web Artifact Framework.   
Following the Dark Web Artifact Framework, the investigator was able to quickly and 
easily determine, based on the artifacts located, that the volunteer user had launched Tor from 
the USB drive on the macOS laptop and installed Tor Browser on the Windows laptop.  Not all 
artifacts indicated in the framework were located during the experimental investigation, 
however new artifacts were discovered that were added to the framework.   
Windows PC - Tor Installed Locally 
On the Windows PC, indicators of Tor having been launched locally rather than from a 
USB include the Windows LNK files and prefetch files indicating where Tor was launched 
from, Tor Browser install executable file located in the downloads folder, places.sqlite file 
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located on the local machine, and Windows registry entries.  The section of the framework 
shown below indicates the artifacts that were located on the Windows hard drive.   
 
 
Figure 58 - Windows Hard Drive Verification Artifacts 
 The artifact details shown below are from for the Start Tor Browser.LNK file located 
using Magnet AXIOM Examine forensic software indicating a path of 
C:\Users\Admin\Desktop\Tor Browser\Browser\firefox.exe.  This artifact indicates that the Tor 
Browser was launched from the Desktop of the Admin user which is the default location of the 
Tor Browser when installed to a local machine.   
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Figure 59 - Start Tor Browser.LNK file 
The artifact details for the Windows prefetch files also indicating the Tor executable 
found in the path \Users\Admin\Desktop\Tor Browser\Browser\TorBrowser\Tor\Tor.exe. 
 
Figure 60 - TOR.EXE Prefetch File 
The Tor Browser download file was located in the \Users\Admin\AppData\Local\ folder 




Figure 61 - Tor Install Artifacts 
 
Figure 62 - Tor Browser Install Executable 
 The places.sqlite file was located in the \Users\Admin\Desktop\Tor 
Browser\Browser\TorBrowser\Data\Browser\profile.default\ folder as directed by the 
framework.  This also indicates that Tor Browser was installed locally on the system rather than 
launched from a USB drive or SD card. 
 
 





Figure 64 - places.sqlite Artifact 
 The Windows registry also contains indicators that Tor was installed locally.  
AppBadgeUpdated, UserAssist, Shellbags, Compatibility Assistant, Mozilla Firefox Launcher, 
Bam State, and AppCompatCache (also known as ShimCache) all contain traces of the Tor 
Browser. 
 
Figure 65 - Registry Artifacts 
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Figure 66 - AppBadgeUpdated Artifact 
 
Figure 67 - UserAssist 
 
Figure 68 - Shellbags 
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Figure 69 - Tor Browser in Shellbags 
 
Figure 70 - Compatibility Assistant Artifact 
 
Figure 71 - NTUSER.DAT Firefox Launcher Artifact 
 
Figure 72 - SYSTEM Registry UserSettings Artifact 
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Windows timeline activity file, ActivitiesCache.db, indicates both the Tor Browser install 
executable file, torbrowser-install-win64-9.5.4_en-US.exe and firefox.exe file used to launch 
the Tor Browser. 
 
Figure 73 - ActivitiesCache.db Artifact 
 
Figure 74 - ActivitiesCache.db Artifact for Tor Brower Install 
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Figure 75 - ActivitiesCache.db Artifact for firefox.exe 
 
Finally, the Tor Browser install files are located on the desktop of the Admin user. 
 
Figure 76 - Tor Browser Install Location 
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Figure 77 - Tor Executable Artifact 
 
macOS Tor Launched from USB 
The absence of the places.sqlite file on the macOS system, along with the presence of 
Tor Browser files is an indicator that Tor was launched from a USB drive rather than installed 
locally.  Artifacts remain on the system but fewer than if Tor is installed locally.  Like in 
Windows, not all artifacts indicated in the framework were located during the experimental 
investigation, however new artifacts were discovered that were added to the framework.  The 
framework branching for Tor Browser artifacts that contain TorBrowser-Data files or user 
information is shown in the screenshot below followed by screenshots of the artifact as found 




Figure 78 - macOS Validation Artifacts 
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Figure 79 - knowledgeC.db Artifact 
 
Figure 80 - org.torproject.torbrowser.plist Artifact 
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Figure 81 - com.apple.ATS.plist Artifact 
 
 
Figure 82 - Saved Application State 
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Figure 83 - CurrentPowerlog.PLSQL Artifact 
The serial number of the USB drive is found in the image verification text file created 
by FTK Imager and can be matched to device information stored in log files in macOS that are 
located in the \private\var\db\diagnostics\Persist\ folder.   
 
Figure 84 - USB (SD Card) Artifacts 
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Figure 85 - FTK Image Verification Drive Serial Number 
 
Figure 86  USB Artifact Serial # 
Tails 
A newly created Tails drive was given to the volunteer user to boot, create persistent 
storage, and generate dark web data.  Using the framework, the investigator was easily able to 
follow the steps to first determine the existence of persistent storage.   
 
Figure 87 - Tails Persistent Storage Branching Determination 
97 
The presence of persistent storage can be determined immediately after imaging the 
Tails drive by adding the evidence item and checking for the presence of a TailsData partition 
which shows as an Unrecognized File System. 
 
Figure 88 - Tails Persistent Storage 
The TailsData partition was exported as a raw image and then copied to a Linux machine for 
password recovery and decryption.   
 
 
Figure 89 - Tails Password Branching 
In this case, the password is unknown so Hashcat ( hashca  - ad anced pass ord reco er ,  
n.d.) was used to find the password (Password1!) meaning the investigation continues.  If the 




Figure 90 - Tails Decrypt, Mount, Copy, Reimage 
The found password was used to decrypt the image using cryptsetup ( cr p se p,  n.d.).  Once 
decrypted, the decrypted image was mounted at which time the contents of the drive can be 
previewed on the Linux machine.  To forensically view the data, it is copied back to the 
Windows forensics machine and reimaged to obtain the valuable data stored within.  In this 
example, the existence of .onion sites marked as bookmarks were located in the places.sqlite 





Figure 91 - Tails Persistent Storage Branching 
 




Figure 93 - places.sqlite Artifacts 
 
 
Figure 94 - Nm-system-connections Artifact 
Previous Case Comparison 
Using a case previously worked at the Digital Forensics Lab at DSU, a comparison was 
made of the artifacts identified in the original casework with artifacts identified using the 
created framework.  This particular case involved a user with a laptop with Windows 7 Home 
installed who had launched the Tor Browser from a SD card.  The suspect in this case was 
thought to be purchasing drugs on the dark web.  Indications of CCleaner, a program used to 
remove things like unwanted files, temporary internet files, and unneeded registry entries, was 
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identified during the exam which could limit some artifacts, however despite this several 
artifacts were still identified ( CCleaner.com - Wha  is CCleaner?,  n.d.).   
Using the framework during the examination of the SD card revealed new artifacts such 
as Firefox add-ons in the extensions.json file.  Additionally, and more importantly, using the 
Dark Web Artifact Framework, the serial number of the SD card was located and matched to 
artifacts located on the hard drive proving the user launched Tor from that particular SD card.   
 
Figure 95 - SD Card Serial Number 
Following the Dark Web Artifact Framework during the examination of the hard drive 
of the laptop revealed artifacts in locations that were not discovered during the initial 
examination.  Files that were located using the framework that were not indicated in the initial 
report include $UsnJrnl:$J, UsrClass.dat, Amcache.hve, Security.evtx, Application.evtx, and 
MPLog-07132009-221054.log.  During the examination of the registry, new artifacts such as 
PCI and PCISTOR were located since the user launched Tor from an SD card.  Keyword 
searches conducted during the initial examination produced four Tor browser artifacts, where 
using the Dark Web Artifact Framework produced all of those artifacts plus the eight additional 
artifacts listed above.  This evaluation demonstrates that the Dark Web Artifact Framework 
allows an investigator to discover more artifacts than by keyword searches alone.  The scope of 
the original investigation included artifacts outside of those identified in the Dark Web Artifact 
Framework such as cryptocurrency and drug references making comparing analyst time with 
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and without the framework difficult.  However, using the framework allows an analyst to point 
directly to these artifacts.  This direct linkage minimizes the necessity to further determine 
whether these artifacts could be left behind for other reasons, thereby reducing false positives 
and saving analysts valuable time. 
Expert Opinion of South Dakota DCI ICAC Team Members 
The primary stakeholders of this research are identified as the investigators trying to 
solve crimes committed using dark web sites such as buying illegal drugs, identity theft, 
weapons, terrorism, illegal pornography, and other criminal material.  To assess whether the 
designed framework contributes to the goal of the stakeholders, the expert opinion of practicing  
digital forensic investigators was sought.  The South Dakota Division of Criminal Investigation 
(DCI)  Internet Crimes Against Children (ICAC) task force focuses on the investigation of 
children who are exploited via the internet or electronic means (DIVISION OF CRIMINAL 
INVESTIGATION, n.d.).  Five members of the ICAC task force were asked to evaluate the Dark 
Web Artifact Framework and give their expert opinion on the ease, adaptability, and usefulness 
of the framework.  The credentials of the ICAC task force members as they provided them are 
found in Appendix B.  Collectively, these five individuals have over 63 years of law 
enforcement experience and over 28 years of experience in digital forensics. 
To complete the assessment of the Dark Web Artifact Framework these investigators 
were each asked the same set of questions to evaluate the effectiveness of the framework.  The 
list of questions posed can be found in Appendix C.  The responses to these questions were 
collected, analyzed, and are summarized below: 
 
The step-by-step design of the framework makes it easy to follow and navigate.  It is a 
roadmap for locating dark web artifacts, with the breakdown between operating systems 
providing additional focus and granularity.  The framework provides efficiency for locating 
artifacts, or ruling out the presence of artifacts, if following the framework returns a null result.  
The interactive, decision-making steps brings awareness of multiple scenarios that may exist 
during an investigation. 
The framework could be adapted to anything that there is information and a need for.  
For example, further branching could be added to accommodate changes or updates to specific 
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operating systems, platforms, or conditions.  Android and iOS options could be added as more 
apps are available to access the dark web using mobile devices.  The framework could also be 
adapted to accommodate other scenarios, such as providing step-by-step instructions for 
performing similar tasks with different software programs. 
The links to further documentation and resources makes the framework useful and gives 
detailed information about each artifact.  This additional information provides supporting 
documentation for investigators when completing forensic examination reports to support their 
findings.  The inclusion of macOS provides investigators who have less experience with macOS 
a way to quickly navigate to those artifacts.  Each examination that is performed is different so 
using the framework is a way to quickly locate dark web artifact locations. 
The rise in the number of devices requiring examination combined with the increasing 
a  f da a ed  e e de ce  a e  a  a   f e  f a e  a e a e .  
The framework gives investigators a detailed listing of relevant artifacts that can be used as a 
checklist to ensure artifacts are not overlooked.  It eliminates the need to manually search 
through the file structure.  Investigators may be less familiar with file structures for some 
operating systems, so the framework makes it easy to quickly determine if those artifacts are 
present on a system.  It also reduces the need to rely on keyword searches which may or may 
not accurately reflect the presence of all artifacts. 
Further enhancements could be made by having the links be more focused to provide 
more specific, detailed information or to have information on artifact-specific anomolies 
regarding operating system versions. 
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Summary of Treatment Validation 
The treatment validation steps described above demonstrate that the created Dark Web 
Artifact Framework meets the requirements set forth by the researcher. 
Easy to follow P 
In each validation step listed above, the Dark Web Artifact Framework was easy to 
follow when locating artifacts.  Each step demonstrated the ease of locating artifacts and when 
new artifacts were discovered they were added to the framework. 
Consider both Windows and macOS operating systems P 
Both Windows PC and macOS operating systems were considered and researched 
extensively while creating this framework.  When designing the Dark Web Artifact Framework, 
data was generated and drives imaged and investigated on both systems.  This was demonstrated 
in the first validation step using a volunteer user to generate dark web data on both a Windows 
PC and macOS system. 
Consider multiple ways to access the dark web using Tor P 
The dark web was accessed in multiple ways on each operating system when designing 
the Dark Web Artifact Framework.  First, each was booted using a Tails stand-alone operating 
system.  Next, within each operating system Tor was launched from a USB drive.  Last, within 
each operating system Tor was installed and launched locally.  This was demonstrated in the 
second validation step when comparing data from a previously worked case using the designed 
framework.  The previous case involved a Windows PC with a removable SD card that was 
used to launch Tor. 
Be adaptable to future platforms P 
The Dark Web Artifact Framework was designed to branch into categories prior to 
pointing to a specific folder or file location.   
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Figure 96 - Windows Artifact Categories 
Future updates of either Windows PC or macOS operating systems may necessitate 
different files or folder locations but the categories will likely remain the same.  If the location 
of artifacts changes to different folders or files, only the end branching of the framework would 
require updating rather than starting over completely.  The Windows categories of launch 
location, Tor install browser artifacts, .onion sites, memory capture, registry files, images 
downloaded, the Windows timeline and Tor Browser install files will all be relevant even if the 
folder or file locations change.  The same is true for the macOS categories of the Tor Browser 
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user files, .onion sites, downloaded images, and memory capture.  This similarity of categories 
between operating systems demonstrates the adaptability to other platforms.   
Additional branching of the framework can be added to account for other platforms.  
Linux, virtual environments such as Whonix, and mobile operating systems of Android or iOS 
could be added to create their own branching. 
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CHAPTER 6  CONCLUSION 
This chapter discusses the accomplishment of the objective of this research, the 
contribution, and limitations and future research.  The dark web has become synonymous with 
nefarious and illicit content in forum sites and underground marketplaces that sell weapons, 
illegal drugs, stolen credit cards, stolen user credentials, child pornography, and more.  Finding 
traces of dark web activity indicating a connection to illegal material may be the difference 
between a suspect being charged with a crime or being allowed to go free to continue to commit 
more of these crimes.  Meeting the objective of this research and making a contribution by 
assisting in providing evidence that a user has accessed dark web market sites to acquire illegal 
goods or services is valuable to investigators of these cases.   
Objective Accomplishment 
The primary objective of this project was to design a reusable framework that can be 
used by digital forensic investigators when searching for host-based artifacts on a computer 
where the use of the dark web is suspected in the commission of a crime.  The objective was 
accomplished with the Dark Web Artifact Framework created using the OSINT Framework as 
a template.  When using the framework, it provides choices to an investigator on the type of 
system being investigated and the method used to access the dark web.  If during the 
investigation it is discovered that artifacts are not being located using one method, it is easy for 
the investigator to go back to another branch, or open multiple branches, in an attempt to locate 
more or different artifacts.  In addition to host-based artifacts, the Dark Web Artifact 
Framework provides branching to locate artifacts left on removable media such as USB drives 
or SD cards.  The framework also provides the means to link removable media to the computer 
by locating the serial number on artifacts both on the removable media and the hard drive.  
Lastly, the Dark Web Artifact Framework also provides a roadmap for investigators to identify 
and decrypt persistent storage on a Tails USB drive. 
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Contribution 
 A digital component can be found in nearly every crime committed today.  The amount 
of data that can be found on these devices is often measured in terabytes rather than gigabytes 
leaving investigators thousands or hundreds of thousands of artifacts to pour through on a single 
device.  The reusable, paperless, comprehensive framework that was designed for this research 
provides investigators with a map to follow to locate the necessary artifacts to determine if the 
system being investigated has been used to access the dark web for the purpose of committing 
a crime.  Addressing both Windows PC and macOS was necessary as cases often include 
evidence of both types.  A resource such as this framework provides a time-saving method for 
investigators to use. 
Limitations and Future Research 
One limitation of this research are the methods considered of accessing the dark web.  
Both Windows PC and macOS were considered and accessed the dark web in multiple ways of 
using a bootable operating system in Tails, launching Tor from a USB drive or SD card, and 
installing Tor Browser locally.  There are additional ways to access the dark web which were 
not considered such as using a Linux machine, using a virtual machine such as Whonix, using 
Orbot from an Android phone, using Onion Browser from an iPhone, or using an alternate 
operating system such as Qubes.  Future research to enhance the Dark Web Artifact Framework 
would include the addition of other operating systems such as those mentioned above, in 
particular mobile systems of Android and iOS.  Mobile devices are increasingly the focus of 
investigations with storage capacity of up to 512GB.  This future research would be added as 
further branching to the existing framework.  A second limitation is that the focus of this 
research was on host-based artifacts, network-based artifacts were not considered for this 
research.   
In the creation of this framework, a process itself was created that will contribute to 
future works.  The yes/no, if/then structure of the framework is adaptable to fit with workflows 
in any area that would benefit from a recurring process.  
This research addressed both Windows PC and macOS systems, however the purpose 
of this research was not to compare the quantity of artifacts left on each operating system.  
109 
Future research to consider would be quantifying the artifacts left behind on each operating 
system to determine the footprint left behind when installing Tor.  Removing Tor from each 
operating system by following the directions on the Tor Project website ( UNINSTALLING  
Tor Projec   Tor Bro ser Man al,  n.d.) removes the Tor install files but leaves many artifacts 
behind.  There are resources to be found for removing traces of Tor from each operating system 
that could be combined into a helpful go-to guide for removing all traces of Tor from a system. 
An additional future enhancement to consider is a method to take the information found 
using the framework and provide an automatic method for transferring the information found 
to the case report that investigators write.  Case reports are a vitally important part of an 
investigation that tells the story of the case.  An automatic means of transferring the information 
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Figure 98 - Digital Forensic Analysis Methodology Process Overview (Justice, 2008) 
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APPENDIX B: DIGITAL FORENSIC INVESTIGATOR 
CREDENTIALS 
Brent Gromer - Supervisory Special Agent / Internet Crimes Against Children 
Commander, South Dakota Division of Criminal Investigation 
24 years law enforcement experience.  11 years experience as a Digital Forensics 
Examiner/Investigator, 6 years ICAC Commander for State of South Dakota, Testified 
extensively as an expert in Digital Forensics and Investigations. 
 
Toby Russell - Special Agent, South Dakota Division of Criminal Investigation 
Employed as a law enforcement officer in the State of South Dakota since June of 1998. 
Attended and completed an eight-week South Dakota Basic Law Enforcement certification in 
South Dakota. Employed as a Patrol Officer and as a Detective with the Mitchell Police 
Department for 14 years and employed as a Special Agent with the South Dakota Division of 
Criminal Investigation (DCI) for the past eight years.  
 
As a Special Agent with the DCI, is assigned to the South Dakota Internet Crimes Against 
Children (ICAC) Task Force a member of the ICAC Task Force since 2007. Over 1300 hours 
of general law enforcement training. Also, over 210 hours of specialized training related to 
conducting Internet and digital evidnece related investigations and over 475 hours of 
specialized training in computer forensics and digital evidence forensics.  Conducted 
hundreds of Internet and digital evidence investigations and conducted over 1300 computer 
forensice examinations, cell phone examinations and digtial evidence examinations. 
 
Hollie Strand - Computer Forensic Analyst, P  C  S  O , Rapid 
City, SD 
Education:  
2003-2005 Masters of Science - Forensic Science Nebraska Wesleyan University 
Completed 12-2005  Emphasis in Investigative Sciences 
2000-2003 Masters of Science  - Counseling  - South Dakota State University 
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Completed 07-2003  Emphasis in Correctional Counseling 
1995-2000 Bachelors of Science - Interdisciplinary Studies, South Dakota School of 
Mines and Technology 
Completed 05-2000  Emphasis in Psychology/Criminology  
1993-1995 Diploma, Central High School 
  Completed 05-1995 
Employment: 
2015  Present - Comp er Forensic Anal s , Penning on Co n  Sheriff s Office  Rapid 
City, SD  
           Analyze submitted evidence; following acceptable forensic methods in evidence 
analysis; writing lab reports on the analysis results; testify in court hearings; provide 
depositions on analysis results and reports; assist with in-service training to law enforcement 
agencies and S a e's and Uni ed S a es  a orneys; assist with public education programs; 
obtain data stored in the form of magnetic or electronic coding on computer media or on 
media capable of being read by a computer; assist with search warrants and the seizure of 
evidence from crime scenes. 
 
Kendra Russell - Special Agent, South Dakota Division of Criminal Investigation 
Internet Crimes Against Children (ICAC), Investigator & Forensic Examiner (3 years); 
Certified Forensic Computer Examiner (CFCE) by International Association of Computer 
Investigative Specialists (IACIS) 
 
Jackson Brown - Special Agent, South Dakota Division of Criminal Investigation, 
Internet Crimes Against Children Task Force 




APPENDIX C: DARK WEB ARTIFACT FRAMEWORK 
EVALUATION QUESTIONS 
Evaluation for Dark Web Artifact Framework 







Background and Credentials:  
 
Questions for evaluation: 
 
o What made the framework easy to follow?   
 
 
o How could this framework be adapted to future platforms? 
 
 
o What did you find particularly useful about the framework? 
 
 
o Describe the differences of doing an investigation with or without the framework. 
 
 
o What could be added or changed to make it better? 
 
 
